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I. INTRODUCTION 
¶1 The case for accommodating religious objectors to same-sex marriage has met 
significant resistance on a number of fronts.  Some believe that religious exemptions 
permit objectors to dodge legal duties to serve same-sex couples that would otherwise 
apply.1  Critics charge that, if extended to public employees, such exemptions would 
burden the ability of same-sex couples to marry.2  Others argue that exemptions coddle 
                                                 
* Class of 1958 Law Alumni Professor of Law, Washington and Lee University School of Law.  This 
Article draws on a series of letters I co-authored about the religious liberty implications of same-sex 
marriage laws sent to legislators in jurisdictions considering legislation.  See, e.g., Letter from Thomas C. 
Berg, Carl H. Esbeck, Robin Fretwell Wilson, and Richard W. Garnett to Sen. Bill Baroni, New Jersey 
(Dec. 4, 2009), available at http://mirrorofjustice.blogs.com/files/wilson-et-al-to-governor-maine-
100509.pdf.  It also draws on Robin Fretwell Wilson, Matters of Conscience: Lessons for Same-Sex 
Marriage from the Healthcare Context, in SAME-SEX MARRIAGE AND RELIGIOUS LIBERTY: EMERGING 
CONFLICTS 77 (Douglas Laycock, Anthony R. Picarello, Jr., & Robin Fretwell Wilson eds., 2008).  I am 
grateful to Kent Greenawalt; Mark Grunewald; Lewis LaRue; Paul Secunda; Marc Stern; the participants of 
the Journal of Law and Social Policy’s 2009 Symposium, “Same-Sex Marriage and Religious 
Accommodation: Determining the Role of the Legislature”; the Annual Law & Religion Roundtable at 
Brooklyn Law School; and the panel at Harvard Law School on “Questions of Conscience? Religious 
Exemptions for Same-Sex Marriage Laws” for their thoughtful comments and critiques.  Many thanks to 
Joe Mercer, George Davis, Julie Arrington, Will Bridges, Merilys Huhn, and Anthony Michael Kreis for 
invaluable research assistance. 
1 Kelly Wentzel, Op-ed, Separate Isn’t Equal, L.A. TIMES, May 10, 2009, 
http://articles.latimes.com/2009/may/10/opinion/le-sunday10.S4 (response to Robin Fretwell Wilson, Op-
ed, The Flip-Side of Same-Sex Marriage, L.A. TIMES, May 3, 2009, 
http://articles.latimes.com/2009/may/03/opinion/oe-wilson3, arguing that photographers fined by the New 
Mexico Human Rights Commission for refusing to photograph a same-sex commitment ceremony “were 
fined for anti-discrimination laws that say you cannot discriminate based on religion, race, gender, age or 
sexual orientation.  So let’s get this straight: [Wilson] is calling for people to be allowed to break the exact 
laws that protect their religious freedom and then demand that the law they broke also protect them.”). 
2 Ira C. Lupu & Robert W. Tuttle, Same-Sex Family Equality and Religious Freedom, 5 NW. J.L. & SOC. 
POL’Y 274, 294 (2010) (“[U]nder both the equal protection clause of the 14th Amendment, and related 
equality provisions of state constitutions, [] state officers have duties of equal respect to all persons within 
the state.  It is very difficult to see how one can square such a duty with a right, religion-based or otherwise, 
to refuse to provide public services to a particular class of individuals.”).  See also Kevin T. Freeman, 
Separate Isn’t Equal, L.A. TIMES, May 10, 2009, http://articles.latimes.com/2009/may/10/opinion/le-
sunday10.S4 (response to Wilson, The Flip-Side of Same-Sex Marriage, supra note 1, arguing that with 
religious liberty exemptions, “Americans will live in ‘separate’ peace and equality.  Separate cannot be, by 
its very nature, equal.  Are gay people citizens or aren’t they?”); Comment by XpeopleWHATon to Robin 
Fretwell Wilson, A Marriage Equality Bill that Respects Religious Objectors, WASH. POST, Nov. 1, 2009, 
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2009/10/26/AR2009102601653.html (“I agree 
with the disagree-ers of this article...substitute the word ‘black’ or ‘Jewish’ or ‘asian’ or ‘woman’ or ‘man’ 
for GAY, and if it doesn't work to exclude any existing group of humanity, it doesn't work to exclude 
humans who are gay. Welcome to the new millennium, where we will thank you for becoming a real 
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wrong-headed people who really do not have a legitimate reason for objecting and who, 
therefore, should not be legally excused.3   
¶2 For many people, the acceptability of religious objections varies with the size of the 
objector’s business.4  Others are willing to exempt church-affiliated organizations from 
directly facilitating same-sex marriage, but draw the line at objections by vendors of 
commercial services needed by couples when they marry, such as reception halls, 
flowers, or photographs.5  Some are willing to exempt both individuals and groups who 
object for religious reasons to facilitating a same-sex marriage so long as they perform no 
government functions and receive no public funds.6  
¶3 A review of the nearly half-dozen new same-sex marriage laws enacted in the past 
year suggests that the least sympathetic of these potential objectors is the government 
employee whose labor is supported by taxpayers, heterosexual and homosexual alike.  
The states that have embraced meaningful religious liberty protections7 have exempted 
                                                                                                                                                 
human being and not supporting segregation.”). 
3 Comment by anarcho-liberal-tarian to Wilson, A Marriage Equality Bill, supra note 2 (“Tolerate 
intolerance?  Not a chance.  Bigotry is bigotry, even if they're pretending God told them to do so.”). 
4 For example, some commentators would permit exemptions for small businesses but not large ones.  
Professor Alan Brownstein, the Boochever and Bird Chair for the Study and Teaching of Freedom and 
Equality at U.C. Davis School of Law, argued in the L.A. Times that: 
[I]t may be appropriate for small businesses such as wedding photographers or caterers to be 
granted religious exemptions that allow them to decline to provide personal services at weddings 
for same-sex couples.  But large businesses and obvious places of accommodation—the places 
where public life in our society takes place—should be open to everyone.  A large hotel should 
have no more right to refuse to provide reception facilities for a same-sex wedding on religious 
grounds than to refuse to provide the reception for a bar mitzvah on religious grounds. 
Alan Brownstein, Op-ed, Religious Freedom and Gay Marriage Can Coexist: Some Accommodations for 
Religious Exemptions Should Be Made in States That Recognize Same-Sex Marriage, But Not All 
Discrimination Should Be Tolerated, L.A. TIMES, May 11, 2009, 
http://www.latimes.com/news/opinion/opinionla/la-oew-brownstein11-2009may11,0,426780.story. 
5 Comment by seller11 to Brownstein, supra note 4 (“Obviously goods and services to the general public 
should have no more protections for bias against same sex weddings than they do for bias against mixed 
race weddings.  If their conscience bothers them, maybe they are in the wrong business.  And similarly, 
churches should not get to push their beliefs onto their employees by denying benefits. . . .  There is no 
reason for the government to recognize a right to bigotry in civil matters.”). 
6 For example, Lara Schwartz, Legal Director and Chief Legislative Counsel for the Human Rights 
Campaign, addressed the tension between faith and work at a panel discussion at The Brookings Institution.  
Evoking her father, she discussed her work on habeas petitions of prisoners on death row while working as 
a judicial clerk for the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit.  Despite her own moral 
objections to capital punishment, she soldiered through, noting that her father pointed out to her that “[i]t 
was [her] job, that’s why they call it work, Lara, and that’s why they call it the United States of America, 
where we are bound to the mast.”  Lara Schwartz, Legal Director and Chief Legislative Counsel, Human 
Rights Campaign, Remarks at a Panel Discussion at The Brookings Institution: Same-Sex Marriage and 
Religious Liberty: A Reconciliation (Mar. 13, 2009) (transcript available at 
http://www.brookings.edu/~/media/Files/events/2009/0313_marriage/20090313_marriage.pdf).  See also 
Comment by roberta3 to Wilson, A Marriage Equality Bill, supra note 2 (“Very simple test . . . substitute 
‘African-American’ or ‘Jew’ for ‘gay’ and if the discrimination in question is OK for one of those, then it is 
OK for ‘gay.’  If not, then taxpayers should not support the organization with a tax exemption.  They can 
believe anything that they want, but the rest of us should not be required to support those beliefs with our 
tax dollars.”).  
 A related critique maintains that marriage registrars and clerks merely stamp and file applications but do 
not perform an act of great religious moment; as a consequence, facilitating a same-sex marriage should 
not, and could not, burden their conscience in the way that actually performing the ceremony would.  I am 
indebted to Professor Paul Secunda for this observation. 
7 Some enacted and proposed exemptions insulate clergy and churches from the duty to solemnize same-
sex marriages—hollow protection since “[n]o one seriously believes that clergy will be forced, or even 
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religious groups and individuals authorized to preside over marriage ceremonies.  But not 
a single state has shielded the government employee at the front line of same-sex 
marriage, such as a marriage registrar who, if she has a religious objection to same-sex 
marriage, will almost certainly face a test of conscience.  Thus, states providing for 
religious exemptions have insulated from suit private religious groups that refuse to 
provide “services, accommodations, advantages, facilities, goods, or privileges” for the 
solemnization of same-sex marriage.8  They have also insulated private religious groups 
from being penalized by the government for such refusals.9  These statutes have 
exempted individuals authorized to celebrate marriage from having to solemnize a same-
sex marriage.10  One state, Connecticut, has exempted religious organizations that 
provide “adoption, foster care or social services,” like Catholic Charities, from the duty to 
                                                                                                                                                 
asked, to perform marriages that are anathema to them.”  Marc Stern, Same-Sex Marriage and the 
Churches, in SAME-SEX MARRIAGE AND RELIGIOUS LIBERTY: EMERGING CONFLICTS 1 (Douglas Laycock, 
Anthony R. Picarello, Jr., & Robin Fretwell Wilson eds., 2008) [hereinafter SAME-SEX MARRIAGE AND 
RELIGIOUS LIBERTY].  For instance, Vermont’s same-sex marriage law provides that it “does not require a 
member of the clergy authorized to solemnize a marriage . . . to solemnize any marriage, and any refusal to 
do so shall not create any civil claim or cause of action.”  VT. STAT. ANN. tit.18, § 5144(b) (2009).  See 
also Religious Freedom and Civil Marriage Equality Amendment Act of 2009, D.C. CODE § 46-406 (2010); 
An Act to End Discrimination in Civil Marriage and Affirm Religious Freedom, ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 
19-A, § 650 (repealed 2009); B. A07732 § 4, 2009–2010 Gen. Assem., Reg. Sess. (N.Y. 2009).  
 Other exemptions provide “protection” that is coterminous with constitutional guarantees.  For instance, 
Maine’s same-sex marriage law—recently repealed by referendum in a people’s veto—expressly “does not 
authorize any court or other state or local governmental body, entity, agency or commission to compel, 
prevent or interfere in any way with any religious institution's religious doctrine, policy, teaching or 
solemnization of marriage within that particular religious faith's tradition as guaranteed by the Maine 
Constitution, Article 1, Section 3 or the First Amendment of the United States Constitution.”  ME. REV. 
STAT. ANN. tit. 19-A, § 650.  See also D.C. CODE § 46-406.  
 As I and others have argued elsewhere, the idea of “forced officiating” is “a distraction from real 
situations where religious conscience [may be] at risk.”  Letter from Robin Fretwell Wilson et al., to Chet 
Culver, Governor, Iowa (July 9, 2009) (on file with author). 
8 See VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 9 § 4502(l) (2009) (“Any refusal to provide services, accommodations, 
advantages, goods, or privileges in accordance with this subsection shall not create any civil claim or cause 
of action.”); see also D.C. CODE § 46-406(e)(2) (“A refusal to provide services, accommodations, facilities, 
or goods in accordance with this subsection shall not create any civil claim or cause of action.”). 
9 See An Act Implementing the Guarantee of Equal Protection under the Constitution of the State for Same 
Sex Couples, 2009 Conn. Pub. Acts No. 09-13, § 17 (“Any refusal to provide services, accommodations, 
advantages, facilities, goods or privileges in accordance with this section shall not create any civil claim or 
cause of action, or result in any state action to penalize or withhold benefits from such religious 
organization, association or society, or any nonprofit institution or organization operated, supervised or 
controlled by or in conjunction with a religious organization, association or society.”); see also D.C. CODE 
§ 46-406(e)(2).   
 Other states provide an exemption without specifying more.  See An Act Affirming Religious Freedom 
Protections with Regard to Marriage, N.H. REV. STAT ANN. § 457:37 (2010) (providing that certain 
“religious organizations” shall “not be required to provide services, accommodations, advantages, facilities, 
goods, or privileges . . . if related to the solemnization of a marriage, the celebration of a marriage, or the 
promotion of marriage . . . in violation of his or her religious beliefs and faith”). 
10 See 2009 Conn. Pub. Acts No. 09-13, § 7(a) (“No member of the clergy authorized to join persons in 
marriage pursuant to section 46b-22 of the general statutes shall be required to solemnize any marriage in 
violation of his or her right to the free exercise of religion guaranteed by the first amendment to the United 
States Constitution or section 3 of article first of the Constitution of the state.”); D.C. CODE § 46-406(e)(1); 
VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 18 § 5144(b) (providing in part that “[t]his section does not require a member of the 
clergy or [certain specified religious societies] to solemnize any [particular] marriage”). 
 Maine’s same-sex marriage law would have exempted any “person authorized to join persons in 
marriage” who refuses “to join persons in marriage [from] any fine or other penalty for such failure or 
refusal.”  ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 19-A, § 650. 
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place children with same-sex couples if the organization receives no public funds,11 while 
two states, Vermont and New Hampshire, have exempted fraternal benefit societies, like 
the Knights of Columbus, from extending benefits to same-sex spouses.12  A single state, 
New Hampshire, exempts individual objectors who work for a religious organization 
from the duty to solemnize, celebrate, or promote same-sex marriages if doing so would 
violate “religious beliefs and faith.”13 
¶4 A clear trend emerges from these statutes: states at the leading edge of same-sex 
marriage legislation have disproportionately insulated large religious institutions and 
their employees from the conflicts ushered in by same-sex marriage, while doing 
relatively little for individual believers.  Notably absent from these early protections are 
marriage registrars, clerks working in the licensing office, and others who may be asked 
to facilitate same-sex marriages despite their own deeply held religious beliefs.   
¶5 This Article takes up what is arguably the hardest case for accommodation: 
exemptions for government employees, namely clerks, working in a state marriage 
registrar’s office, because a rich substrate of empirical evidence can assist to evaluate the 
wisdom of exemptions.14  As others have rightly observed, “If any analysis evaluating the 
costs of granting or failing to grant accommodations is going to be persuasive, it has to 
demonstrate to both sides of the same-sex marriage debate that the costs and burdens they 
are being asked to bear are accurately described and acknowledged.”15  This Article 
argues that government employees who have religious objections should be permitted to 
step aside from facilitating same-sex marriages when it poses no hardship for same-sex 
couples.  In other words, when another willing clerk would gladly perform the necessary 
                                                 
11 2009 Conn. Pub. Acts No. 09-13, § 19 (“Nothing in this act shall be deemed or construed to affect the 
manner in which a religious organization may provide adoption, foster care or social services if such 
religious organization does not receive state or federal funds.”). 
12 VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 8 § 4501(b) (“The civil marriage laws shall not be construed to affect the ability of a 
society to determine the admission of its members as provided in section 4464 of this title, or to determine 
the scope of beneficiaries in accordance with section 4477 of this title, and shall not require a society that 
has been established and is operating for charitable and educational purposes and which is operated, 
supervised, or controlled by or in connection with a religious organization to provide insurance benefits to 
any person if to do so would violate the society’s free exercise of religion as guaranteed by the First 
Amendment of the Constitution of the United States or by Chapter I, Article 3 of the Constitution of 
Vermont.”); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 457:37(IV) (2009). 
13 N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 457:37(III) (exempting “any individual who is managed, directed, or supervised 
by or in conjunction with a religious organization, association, or society . . . [from providing] services, 
accommodations, advantages, facilities, goods, or privileges to an individual if such request . . . is related to 
the solemnization of a marriage, the celebration of a marriage, or the promotion of marriage . . . and such 
solemnization, celebration, or promotion of marriage is in violation of his or her religious beliefs and 
faith”). 
14 Thus, the term “government employee” in this Article encompasses marriage registrars, clerks working 
in the licensing office, and others who have a ministerial function, but who are not charged with performing 
marriages.  In many states, Justices of the Peace are authorized marriage celebrants.  See, e.g., CONN. GEN. 
STAT. § 46b-22 (2009) (“Persons authorized to solemnize marriages in this state include . . . justices of the 
peace.”); MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 207, § 38 (2009) (“A marriage may be solemnized in any place within the 
commonwealth by . . . a justice of the peace.”).  While the proposed Marriage Conscience Protection, infra 
Appendix B, would encompass Justices of the Peace, the lack of available data on Justices of the Peace—as 
compared to government employees—makes it difficult practically to assess the impact of a hardship 
exemption for Justices of the Peace.  Nonetheless, a hardship exemption itself ensures both access to the 
status of marriage and religious liberty.  See infra Parts II–IV. 
15 Alan Brownstein, Gays, Jews, and Other Strangers in a Strange Land: The Case for Reciprocal 
Accommodation of Religious Liberty and the Right of Same-Sex Couples to Marry *24 (2010) 
(unpublished manuscript, on file with author). 
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task for a same-sex couple, it is incumbent upon a pluralistic liberal democracy to avoid 
forcing a needless choice between one’s beliefs and one’s livelihood.  In the case where 
another willing clerk is not available, however, the employee’s religious objection must 
yield because the state has granted same-sex couples the right to marry.  Because this 
exemption balances two competing interests, when the lights are on and the doors are 
open at the local clerk’s office, same-sex couples may be assured that they will be served 
as other members of the public are served.   
¶6 Part II documents the very real human costs that would flow from denying an 
accommodation and recounts a rash of dismissals, disciplinary proceedings, fines, and 
warnings leveled at government employees who object for religious reasons to assisting 
with same-sex marriage.  Drawing on Massachusetts’ experience with same-sex 
marriage, this part shows that many government employees simply could not have 
anticipated when they began their jobs years before that they would be asked to facilitate 
same-sex marriages.  Many have built up retirement and other benefits that would be 
wiped out if they leave their jobs rather than violate a religious conviction.  
¶7 Part III then presents a proposed exemption that would allow government 
employees to step aside from facilitating same-sex marriages only when it poses no 
hardship to same-sex couples.  Drawing again on Massachusetts, this part shows that 
same-sex marriage licenses constitute a minuscule part of the workload for state clerk 
offices, suggesting that staffing around religious objections would pose negligible costs. 
¶8 Parts IV and V then examine two commonly articulated reasons for dismissing the 
need to accommodate government employees: that a religious liberty accommodation 
would unconstitutionally burden the right to marry, and that government employees owe 
taxpayers service untainted by their private religious beliefs.16   
                                                 
16 Other claims are also made.  Some maintain that equality should trump religious liberty.  See Lupu & 
Tuttle, supra note 2, at 294 (“Thus, under both the equal protection clause of the 14th Amendment, and 
related equality provisions of state constitutions, such state officers have duties of equal respect to all 
persons within the state.  It’s very difficult to see how one can square such a duty with a right, religion-
based or otherwise, to refuse to provide public services to a particular class of individuals.”).  Marc Stern, 
Acting Co-Executive Director/General Counsel of the American Jewish Congress, challenges whether 
marriage equality claims should prevail in a contest with religious liberty claims.  He argues that opponents 
of broad protection for religious liberty believe “that the equality interests behind same-sex marriage trump 
the liberty interests behind a religious exemption.”  Marc Stern, Liberty v. Equality; Equality v. Liberty, 5 
NW. J.L. & SOC. POL’Y 307, 311 (2010).  For Stern, how one conceives of claims to same-sex marriage 
may be outcome determinative.  If “[s]een through the prism of individual liberty, it is hard to see why the 
states should systematically avoid burdening same-sex couples, no matter how lightly . . . at the expense of 
other liberties, including the ability of others to practice their faith.  But if the right to same-sex marriage 
sounds in equality, not liberty, and the right to equality is given preferential status, then the arguments 
against an exemption become plain.”  Id. at 314.  Stern ultimately sees the resistance to exemptions to 
same-sex marriage laws as resting on a moral autonomy claim—namely that “moral choices of citizens 
may not be questioned by other citizens, at least not in ways that move beyond the theoretical.  One may 
not confront an individual’s moral choice directly, or impede him or her in acting on that moral choice.” Id. 
at 316.  This view, he argues, confuses “immunity from legal impediments to carrying out one’s moral 
choices, on the one hand, with a ban on criticism and the refusal to assist in the carrying out of other’s 
moral choice on the other hand.  The two are not the same.”  Id. 
 Others argue that the very fact that the law would recognize religious objections to same-sex marriage 
imposes a dignitary harm on same-sex couples.  See Comment by seller11, supra note 5 (“There is no 
reason for the government to recognize a right to bigotry in civil matters.”).  For a response to this, see 
Robin Fretwell Wilson, The Calculus of Accommodation: A Comment on Koppelman and Dent’s ‘Must 
Gay Rights Conflict with Religious Liberty?’ (2009) (unpublished manuscript, on file with author) 
[hereinafter Wilson, The Calculus of Accommodation] (arguing that (1) ideally accommodations should, 
and can, be structured so that they are invisible to the public; and (2) that “the possibility of dignitary harm 
Vol. 5:2] Robin Fretwell Wilson 
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¶9  Part IV addresses the claim that religious liberty protections will impermissibly 
frustrate the right to marry.  This part shows that marriage regulations easily survive 
constitutional challenge on this ground so long as they do not significantly interfere with 
a couple’s ability to marry.  This part concludes that, unlike marriage restrictions struck 
down by the U.S. Supreme Court, a hardship exemption cannot, by its terms, block 
access to the institution of marriage.  Part V takes up the claim that government 
employees owe the public services untainted by their religious beliefs.  It concludes that 
there is nothing illegitimate in allowing government employees to step aside from 
facilitating same-sex marriage when no one is otherwise burdened.  Indeed, federal law 
generally demands the reasonable accommodation of a worker’s religious beliefs where it 
does not cause an undue hardship for the employer or other employees.17  Ultimately, this 
Article concludes that legislation recognizing same-sex marriage provides the flexibility 
to affirm two principles deserving of respect in a liberal society, both marriage equality 
and religious liberty. 
II. THE NEED FOR GOVERNMENT EMPLOYEE EXEMPTIONS 
¶10 The religious liberty exemptions in the newly enacted marriage laws in Vermont, 
Connecticut, New Hampshire, and the District of Columbia all provide protections for 
religious organizations but fail to account for individuals other than authorized celebrants 
and, in one instance, persons employed by religious institutions.  While it remains to be 
seen whether large institutions, such as Catholic Charities,18 can weather the financial 
                                                                                                                                                 
will not take policymakers very far because there are two dignitary harms here—the harm to lesbian and 
gay couples who are turned aside, and the harm to religious believers who are told that their beliefs are not 
to be tolerated . . .”). 
17 See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1) (2010) (“It shall be an unlawful employment practice for an employer . . . 
to discriminate against any individual . . . because of such individual's religion.”); see also infra Part V 
(discussing the requirements of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964). 
18 In fiscal year 2007, Catholic Charities USA reported $24,287,146 in revenue.  See CharityNavigator.org, 
Catholic Charities USA, http://www.charitynavigator.org/index.cfm?bay=search.summary&orgid=10656 
(last visited Aug. 15, 2010).  “Approximately 65 percent of [this] revenue [comes] from government 
contracts.”  Jacqueline L. Salmon, Government Cutbacks Leave Faith-Based Services Hurting, WASH. 
POST, Feb. 20, 2009, http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-
dyn/content/article/2009/02/19/AR2009021903512.html. 
 The refusal to provide exemptions to such organizations has resulted in tangible costs to religious 
organizations and perhaps also the public.  In February 2010, the Archdiocese of Washington, D.C., ended 
its eighty-year-old foster care placement program rather than approve same-sex couples for placement, 
which presumably would be required as a result of D.C.’s nondiscrimination laws and its new same-sex 
marriage law.  See Michelle Boorstein, Citing Same-Sex Marriage Bill, Washington Archdiocese Ends 
Foster-Care Program, WASH. POST, Feb. 17, 2010, http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-
dyn/content/article/2010/02/16/AR2010021604899.html; Emily Esfahani Smith, Washington, Gay 
Marriage and the Catholic Church, WALL ST. J., Jan. 9, 2010, 
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052748703478704574612451567822852.html (“By passing gay 
marriage, the City Council has put the Catholic Church, or more accurately, the Archdiocese of 
Washington, in an awkward position.  Either the church will have to recognize gay marriage or it will be 
forced to abandon a large portion of its charitable programs.”).  Religious adoption placement services have 
also shut down.  See Robin Fretwell Wilson, A Matter of Conviction: Moral Clashes Over Same-Sex 
Adoption, 22 BYU J. PUB. L. 475, 479–83 (2008) [hereinafter Wilson, A Matter of Conviction] 
(documenting the exit of religious social services providers and other vendors from the market in the 
absence of an exemption); Robin Fretwell Wilson, Matters of Conscience: Lessons for Same-Sex Marriage 
from the Healthcare Context, in SAME-SEX MARRIAGE AND RELIGIOUS LIBERTY, supra note 7, at 86–90 
[hereinafter Wilson, Matters of Conscience] (discussing calls that religious organizations should lose their 
tax exemption). 
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fall-out from honoring their religious convictions, individuals usually cannot.  As a result, 
real people are being forced to violate their consciences or pay a hefty price.  This part 
first documents the dilemma that government employees have encountered in 
jurisdictions across the globe and the United States.  It then provides concrete examples 
of the human costs that would accompany a refusal to provide an accommodation. 
A. The Choice Between One’s Beliefs and One’s Job 
¶11 In countries with longer experiences with same-sex marriage than the United 
States, individuals who object for religious reasons to facilitating same-sex marriages 
have been fired from or disciplined in their jobs.  In the Netherlands, for example, a 
registrar was dismissed after refusing for religious reasons to solemnize the wedding of a 
same-sex couple.  The registrar was later reinstated by the Commissie Gelijke 
Behandeling, which enforces that country’s General Equal Treatment Act.19  As the 
Commissie explained, insufficient reasons supported the refusal to renew the registrar’s 
contract since other public servants were prepared to assist same-sex couples.20   
¶12 In the United Kingdom, a civil marriage registrar, Lillian Ladele, was disciplined 
after she refused for religious reasons to act as a registrar for same-sex civil partnerships.  
The office in which Ladele worked designated all employees as civil partnership 
registrars.  Ladele made “informal arrangements with colleagues to swap assignments, so 
she avoided officiating at civil partnerships,”21 until two co-workers said “they felt 
‘victimised’ by Ms. Ladele not carrying out civil partnership duties.”22  This prompted 
“formal disciplinary proceedings . . . on the ground that she ‘had refus[ed] to carry out 
[her] work . . . solely on the grounds of sexual orientation of the customers of that 
service.’”23  After a hearing, the disciplinary board instructed Ladele to perform civil 
partnerships or be terminated.  She sued.  A unanimous decision of the England and 
Wales Court of Appeal ultimately dismissed24 Ladele’s appeal after concluding that, in 
the absence of a specific exemption, Ladele’s refusal to “perform civil partnerships . . . 
amounts to discrimination.”25  
                                                 
19 E.U. NETWORK OF INDEP. EXPERTS ON FUNDAMENTAL RIGHTS, OP. NO. 4-2005, THE RIGHT TO 
CONSCIENTIOUS OBJECTION AND THE CONCLUSION BY EU MEMBER STATES OF CONCORDATS WITH THE 
HOLY SEE, available at http://ec.europa.eu/justice_home/cfr_cdf/doc/avis/2005_4_en.pdf.  
20 Id.  The Commissie later reversed its position, but was overruled by townships and localities.  George 
Conger, Dutch Registrars Banned from Refusing to Perform Gay Weddings (Apr. 18, 2008), 
http://transfigurations.blogspot.com/2008/04/dutch-registrars-banned-from-refusing.html; Marjolein van 
den Brink, ‘I hereby pronounce you . . .’: Conflicting Rights of Same-Sex Bridal Couples and Objecting 
Marriage Officials (unpublished manuscript, on file with author). 
21 Ladele v. Islington LBC, [2009] EWCA Civ 1357, [1]–[78] (Eng.), available at 
http://www.bailii.org/ew/cases/EWCA/Civ/2009/1357.html.   
22 Id. ¶ 8. 
23 Id. ¶ 15. 
24 The first body to review the case, the Employment Tribunal, reversed and concluded that “Ms Ladele had 
suffered both direct and indirect discrimination, as well as harassment . . . on grounds of her religious 
belief. . . .”  Id. ¶ 18.   That decision was itself reversed by the Employment Appeal Tribunal, which found 
that Ladele’s employer was entitled to provide no exemption; Ladele appealed.  Id. ¶ 21. 
25 While the decision concluded that Ladele’s employer acted correctly once it designated Ladele as a civil 
partnership registrar, it “doubt[ed] whether a decision by [the employer] that she would not be designated a 
civil partnership registrar, at her request because of her religious problems with officiating at civil 
partnerships, would fall foul of the 2007 Regulations.”  Id. ¶ 74. 
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¶13 In addition to dismissal and discipline, some countries have witnessed a departure 
of government employees and contractors from roles they had long performed when 
religious exemptions were not forthcoming.26  In Manitoba, Canada, twelve officials 
empowered to perform marriage ceremonies quit en masse because they refused to 
perform same-sex marriages as required by provincial law.27  In the United Kingdom, a 
Christian couple who fostered almost thirty children quit as foster parents after being 
asked to sign a contract requiring them to promote a positive view of same-sex 
relationships.28  The County Council removed from the couple’s care an eleven-year-old 
boy who lived with them for two years and placed him with another family.29 
¶14 In the United States, government employees have received a stream of advice and 
cautions to serve all persons even if doing so would violate deeply held religious beliefs.  
After Massachusetts recognized same-sex marriage in 2003,30 the chief counsel to then-
Governor Mitt Romney told the state’s Justices of the Peace that they must “follow the 
law, whether you like it or not.”31  One linchpin of that “law” is Massachusetts’ statute 
forbidding discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation, which subjects violators to as 
much as $50,000 in civil fines.32 
¶15 The Iowa Attorney General took a similar position following Iowa’s 2009 same-sex 
marriage decision, Varnum v. Brien.33  He told county recorders: 
We expect duly-elected county recorders to comply with the Iowa 
Constitution as interpreted unanimously by the Iowa Supreme Court, the 
highest court in Iowa.  Our country lives by and thrives by the rule of law, 
and the rule of law means we all follow the law as interpreted by our 
courts—not by ourselves.  We don’t each get to decide what the law is; 
that would lead to chaos.  We must live by and follow what the courts 
decide.  
                                                 
26 Wilson, A Matter of Conviction, supra note 18, at 479–483. 
27 Bill Graveland, Alberta Allowing Same-Sex Marriage but Adding Protection to Opponents, CAN. PRESS, 
July 12, 2005 (on file with author). 
28 James Mill, Foster Child To Be Taken Away Because Christian Couple Refuse to Teach Him about 
Homosexuality, DAILY MAIL ONLINE, Oct. 23, 2007, http://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-
489285/Foster-child-taken-away-Christian-couple-refuse-teach-homosexuality.html. 
29 Id.  Local governments in the United Kingdom have also nixed as “unsuitable” for new placements a 
Christian couple who had fostered fifteen children after the couple indicated they would share Biblical 
teachings about homosexuality if the issue arose.  Rachel Harden, ‘Unsuitable’ foster-parents to appeal, 
CHURCH TIMES, Feb. 29, 2008, available at http://www.churchtimes.co.uk/content.asp?id=52673. 
30 Goodridge v. Dep’t of Pub. Health, 798 N.E.2d 941 (Mass. 2003). 
31 Katie Zezima, Obey Same-Sex Marriage Law, Officials Told, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 26, 2004, at A15.  Some 
Massachusetts Justices of the Peace had previously announced they would resign if forced to perform 
same-sex marriages.  Kathleen Burge, Justices of the Peace Confront Gay Marriage, BOSTON GLOBE, Apr. 
18, 2004, at B1. 
32 MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 151B § 5(c) (2010) (fining those who have “been adjudged to have 
committed 2 or more discriminatory practices during the 7-year period ending on the date of the filing of 
the complaint” as much as $50,000; “if the acts constituting the discriminatory practice that is the object of 
the complaint are committed by the same natural person who has been previously adjudged to have 
committed acts constituting a discriminatory practice,” the $50,000 fine can be imposed “without regard to 
the period of time within which any subsequent discriminatory practice occurred”).  In Connecticut, an 
individual who violates the public accommodations provision of the anti-discrimination statute can be 
jailed for up to thirty days.  CONN. GEN. STAT. § 46a–81d(b) (2010). 
33 763 N.W.2d 862 (Iowa 2009). 
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. . . . 
The Court’s ruling applies everywhere in Iowa, in every county.  
Recorders do not have discretion or power to ignore the Iowa Supreme 
Court’s ruling. 
. . . All county recorders in the state of Iowa are required to comply with 
the Varnum decision following issuance of procedendo from the Supreme 
Court, and to issue marriage licenses to same sex couples in the same 
manner as licenses issued to opposite gender applicants.34 
As if this were not emphatic enough, the Attorney General added: “[I]f necessary, we will 
explore legal actions to enforce and implement the Court’s ruling, working with the Iowa 
Depart. of Public Health and county attorneys.”35 
¶16 The Iowa Attorney General’s blanket refusal to allow government officials to step 
aside from facilitating same-sex marriages extends to judges as well.  In Iowa, ethics 
rules have been leveraged to squeeze out the discretion judges would otherwise have 
about which marriage ceremonies to preside over.  A spokesperson for Iowa’s Attorney 
General cautioned that while “judges and magistrate judges have discretion whether . . . 
to participate in wedding ceremonies . . . they should certainly do so without bias or 
prejudice, as per the Code of Judicial Conduct.”36 
¶17 Individuals have responded rationally to these strong signals.  Because judges lack 
the ability to refuse to perform same-sex marriages, even when others would gladly assist 
a same-sex couple, at least one Iowa magistrate has stopped performing marriages 
altogether.37  In Massachusetts,38 several Justices of the Peace said they would resign 
because no exemption was available, and at least one did so.39  
¶18 These experiences make clear that absent an exemption, government employees, 
contractors, and officials who adhere to a traditional view of marriage, based on deeply 
held religious beliefs about marriage, have two choices: refuse at peril to one’s own job 
or violate their fundamental beliefs.40   
                                                 
34 Press Release, Iowa Dep’t Justice, Office Attorney Gen., Statement of Iowa Attorney General Tom 
Miller—County Recorders Must Comply with Supreme Court’s Varnum Decision (Apr. 21, 2009), 
available at http://www.state.ia.us/government/ag/latest_news/releases/apr_2009/Marrige_Stmnt.html. 
35 Id.  
36 See Kilian Melloy, Iowa Magistrate to Stop Performing Marriages, EDGE BOSTON, Apr. 23, 2009, 
http://www.edgeboston.com/index.php?ch=news&sc=&sc2=news&sc3=&id=90310 (quoting Bob 
Brammer, a spokesperson for Iowa’s Attorney General’s office).   
37 See id.; Jason Clayworth, Iowa Judge to Stop Performing Marriages, DES MOINES REG., Apr. 23, 2009, 
http://m.dmregister.com/news.jsp?key=449534.  Magistrates in Iowa are authorized by law to preside over 
weddings.  IOWA CODE § 595.10(1) (2010). 
38 Zezima, supra note 31 (discussing announcement from Governor’s chief counsel); Burge, supra note 31. 
39 See Emily Shartin, Clerks in Suburbs Ready for May 17 Gay Marriages, BOSTON GLOBE, May 13, 2004, 
at 1 (reporting that a Bellingham, Massachusetts Town Clerk, Kathleen Harvey, planned to resign her post 
as Justice of the Peace “because she feels ‘uncomfortable’ about the prospect of performing same-sex 
marriages”); Steve Inskeep, Mass. Justice of the Peace Resigns Over Gay Marriage (Nat’l Pub. Radio 
broadcast May 14, 2004), available at http://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyId=1896321 
(indicating that a Charlton, Massachusetts Justice of the Peace, Linda Gray Kelley, “chose to resign her 
post rather than perform gay marriages”). 
40 Some have argued that a person can have a moral objection to an act that does not give rise to “a claim of 
conscience to avoid participating.”  See Kent Greenawalt, The Significance of Conscience, __ SAN DIEGO 
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B. The Human Cost of Denying Accommodations 
¶19 Some people see the religious objections of government employees as nothing 
more than personal hang-ups that they should just get over:  
[A] justice of the peace[’s] [“JOTP”] role is purely civil, not religious.  As 
a representative of the state, his role is to issue marriage licenses to those 
qualified couples who request it and are qualified to marry under 
Louisiana law.  If he has moral objections to some couples, he should 
resign as a JOTP, as a civil servant, if you can’t do your job, you resign.41  
For these critics, religious liberty exemptions represent a “get out of jail free” card 
authorizing discrimination.42  The proper way to resolve the conflict, the critics maintain, 
is for the objector to quit: 
Obviously goods and services to the general public should have no more 
protections for bias against same sex weddings than they do for bias 
against mixed race weddings.  If their conscience bothers them, maybe 
they are in the wrong business.43    
¶20 This cavalier dismissal of religious objections overlooks the fact that allowing 
government employees to step aside from facilitating same-sex marriage will cost same-
sex couples and the government itself very little, if anything, as Part III explains.44  This 
                                                                                                                                                 
L. REV. __ n.4 (forthcoming 2010) (giving as an example a nurse opposed to elective plastic surgery who 
might nonetheless believe that “her moral duties as a nurse to do what she is asked actually outweigh any 
negative moral aspect of her participation”). 
41 Posting of Matthew in NYC to Right Across the Atlantic, 
http://www.theatlanticright.com/2009/10/16/the-devils-advocate-checks-in-denying-marriage-services/ 
(Oct. 16, 2009) (discussing the Louisiana Justice of the Peace who refused on non-religious grounds to 
marry an interracial couple and observing that “[t]he same would apply in Iowa, Massachusetts, Vermont 
etc., if a JOTP can’t marry all legally qualified couples, including same-sex couples, s/he shouldn’t 
continue as a JOTP”). 
42 Religious Liberty Implications of D.C.’s Same-Sex Marriage Bill (18-482): Hearing before D.C. Council, 
at 6:57:55, Nov. 2, 2009 (statement of Councilmember Catania), available at 
http://oct.dc.gov/services/on_demand_video/channel13/november2009/11_02_09_JUDICI.asx (“If [an 
objector is a clerk] who [chooses] not to provide [a] service that [she] ha[s] accepted the job to provide but  
. . . still want[s] an entire salary as if [she] were providing 100% of the service, [then she is asking for] all 
of the benefits of the position [while feeling] entitled to discriminate.”). 
43 Comment by seller11, supra note 5.  This view is shared by some persons in local government.  The first 
vice president of the Massachusetts Town Clerks’ Association, Judith St. Croix, a town clerk herself, 
indicated in 2004 that “most clerks, regardless of their personal views, will follow the law . . . and ‘will do 
their job.’ . . . She indicated that ‘[i]f they have a problem, then yes, they should resign.’”  Shartin, supra 
note 39, at 2.  Although the charge of illegal “discrimination” or “bias” is a common refrain, applying 
conclusory labels and telling objectors to “follow the law” is not helpful when the dialogue is about what 
the law should be.   
44 Others have also argued that forcing religious objectors to leave their jobs is a bad idea.  See Letter from 
Luke Goodrich, Legal Counsel, The Becket Fund for Religious Liberty, to Office of Pub. Health and Sci., 
Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., available at http://www.becketfund.org/files/ea888.pdf (arguing that 
forcing conscientious objectors out of their jobs violates state and federal law, it excludes a certain segment 
of the population from certain jobs purely on the grounds of moral or religious beliefs, it hurts long-serving 
employees who did not foresee the changes when they first took the job, and it limits the pool of available 
persons to do the work). 
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stance also assumes that any refusal is motivated by gay animus.45  But for many people, 
marriage is a religious institution and wedding ceremonies are a religious sacrament.46  
For them, assisting with marriage ceremonies has a religious significance that 
commercial services that are subject to non-discrimination bans, like ordering burgers 
and hailing taxis, simply do not.  Many of these people have no objection generally to 
providing services to lesbians and gays, but they would object to directly facilitating a 
same-sex marriage.  
¶21 Perhaps most troubling, this intransigence discounts the harsh effect of telling 
government employees to “pack up and get another job.”  Many of these employees 
could never have imagined when they took their jobs that they would be asked to 
facilitate a same-sex marriage.  Consider the seventy-year-old marriage commissioner in 
Saskatchewan, Canada, a public official who had married couples since 1983.  He was 
fined $2500 by the provincial Human Rights Tribunal when he refused to perform a 
marriage ceremony for a same-sex couple, citing his religious beliefs.47  On appeal, the 
Court of Queens Bench held that even though the marriage took place, the objecting 
commissioner had discriminated on the basis of sexual orientation when he considered 
“his personal religious views when performing his public functions.”48   
¶22 Like the Saskatchewan commissioner, many state employees in the United States 
began working for the government well before same-sex marriage was recognized 
anywhere in the world.  First recognized in 2001 by the Netherlands, same-sex marriage 
did not find acceptance in any U.S. jurisdiction until 2004, when Massachusetts began 
issuing marriage licenses to same-sex couples.49  A Council of State Governments report 
shows that many government employees worked in the public sector for decades before 
same-sex marriage became a legal possibility.  Consider the handful of states that 
recognize same-sex marriage and also provide data on the percentage of state employees 
who were eligible for retirement in 2002.50  Generally, to be eligible for retirement, an 
employee must have worked for a substantial length of time.51  In California and Maine, 
for example, which legally recognized same-sex marriage only to later have it repealed,52 
                                                 
45 See supra notes 3, 5–6 and accompanying text. 
46 Charles J. Reid, Jr., Marriage: Its Relationship to Religion, Law, and the State, in SAME-SEX MARRIAGE 
AND RELIGIOUS LIBERTY, supra note 7, at 157–67 (arguing that historical understandings of marriage were 
grounded in the notion that it is a “divine institution”).  
47 Nichols v. M.J., 2009 SQKB S09F0132 (Queen’s Bench for Saskatchewan 2009); Service Club Pledges 
Support, LEADER-POST (REGINA), Apr. 17, 2007, available at 
http://www.canada.com/reginaleaderpost/news/sports/story.html?id=ab7789c1-5988-421d-bd3b-
1ade424e87b1.  Although the commissioner was not a government employee and received no pay from the 
government, he performed a public function. 
48 Nichols, supra note 47. 
49 Goodridge v. Dep’t of Pub. Health, 798 N.E.2d 941 (Mass. 2003); Carolyn Lochhead, Pivotal Day for 
Gay Marriage in U.S. Nears, S.F. CHRONICLE, May 2, 2004, at A1, available at http://www.sfgate.com/cgi-
bin/article.cgi?f=/c/a/2004/05/02/MARRIAGE.TMP. 
50 JAMES B. CARROLL & DAVID A. MOSS, COUNCIL OF STATE GOV’TS, STATE EMPLOYEE WORKER 
SHORTAGE: THE IMPENDING CRISIS 16 (Oct. 2002), available at 
http://www.csg.org/knowledgecenter/docs/TA0210WorkShortage.pdf; Press Release, Conn. Comm’n on 
Aging, Commission in Aging’s Workplace Flexibility Proposal Advances; Agency Estimates Potential 
Annual State Savings of $22 Million (undated), available at 
http://www.cga.ct.gov/coa/PDFs/News%20Releases/WorkplaceFlexiblitynewsrelease.pdf.  Numbers for 
Massachusetts are not available. 
51 See infra note 66 (discussing length of service requirements for retirement). 
52 CAL. CONST. art. I, § 7.5; An Act to End Discrimination in Civil Marriage and Affirm Religious 
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roughly fifty percent of government employees were eligible for retirement in 2002.53  In 
Connecticut, which first recognized same-sex marriage by judicial decision but later 
enacted a same-sex marriage law,54 seventeen percent of public employees were 
retirement-eligible as of 2002.  Roughly one in every four or five employees working for 
the government in Iowa (seventeen percent),55 New Hampshire (twenty-two percent),56 
and Vermont (twenty-five percent)57 already qualify for retirement. There is no reason to 
think that clerks in state registrar offices or other employees as a group are more likely to 
be newcomers to the job than their counterparts. 
¶23 Because of their long tenure in these jobs, many government employees simply 
could not have anticipated when they took their jobs that facilitating same-sex marriages 
would be part of their duties.58  On average, workers in Iowa had worked thirteen years 
by 2002, in New Hampshire nine years, and in Vermont eleven years—all more than a 
decade before same-sex marriage was recognized by their state.59  For those far into their 
work lives, moving to other employment may be impractical or even impossible.60     
¶24 Dismissal will likely also be very costly to the religious objectors.61  A job in the 
state licensure office pays well,62 especially in light of the qualifications required.  Many 
clerk positions require only a high school diploma.63  These jobs provide generous 
                                                                                                                                                 
Freedom, ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 19-A, § 650 (repealed 2009).  But see Ashby Jones, Calif. Supremes 
Decline to Order Officials to Defend Prop. 8, WALL STREET J., Sept. 9, 2010, available at 
http://blogs.wsj.com/law/2010/09/09/calif-supremes-decline-to-order-officials-to-defend-prop-8 (discussing 
the murky status of Proposition 8, after being struck down by a Federal Judge as unconstitutional). 
53 CARROLL & MOSS, supra note 50, at 16. 
54 Kerrigan v. Comm’r of Pub. Health, 957 A.2d 407 (Conn. 2008); An Act Implementing the Guarantee of 
Equal Protection under the Constitution of the State for Same Sex Couples, 2009 Conn. Pub. Acts No. 09-
13. 
55 CARROLL & MOSS, supra note 50, at 16. 
56 Id. 
57 Id. 
58 While these employees would recognize that their positions as public servants involve serving the public, 
Part V documents a long and rich tradition permitting government employees in certain circumstances to 
continue in their roles without performing services that violate deeply held religious beliefs.  See infra Part 
V (discussing protections provided by Title VII).   
59 CARROLL & MOSS, supra note 50, at 17 (providing average years of service as of 2002 for state 
employees in select states). 
60 Id. (reporting an average age for state employees in Iowa, New Hampshire, and Vermont as forty-six, 
forty-three, and forty-three, respectively); see also Maria Mallory, Age Discrimination Pervades, Difficult 
to Prove, Experts Say, TRIB. BUS. NEWS, Jan. 9, 2000. 
61 As Professor Brownstein notes, it may be possible for religious objectors to same-sex marriage to obey 
their “religious obligations without incurring . . . serious burdens” like dismissal—for example, by seeking 
a transfer to another department as contemplated by Title VII.  Brownstein, supra note 15, at 24.  See also 
infra Part V for a discussion of transfers and other accommodations under Title VII.    
62 A July 2008 report of the U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics indicates that the median annual salary for local 
government clerks is $49,414.  BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS, U.S. DEP’T OF LABOR, CAREER GUIDE TO 
INDUSTRIES tbl.4 (2010–11), available at http://www.bls.gov/oco/cg/cgs042.htm.  That compensation 
exceeds mean annual wages for all occupations ($42,270) and is higher than the compensation for 
“community and social services occupations” ($41,790), “education, training and library occupations” 
($48,460), “healthcare support occupations” ($26,340), “protective service occupants” ($40,200), and many 
others.  Bureau of Labor Statistics, U.S. Dep’t of Labor, May 2008 National Occupational Employment and 
Wage Estimates, http://www.bls.gov/oes/2008/may/oes_nat.htm#b00-0000 (last visited Sept. 3, 2010) 
(using means rather than medians and combining court and license clerks with municipal clerks, which 
does not allow for precise, “apples to apples” comparisons).  
63 The International Institute of Municipal Clerks (IIMC) indicates that qualifications vary from 
municipality to municipality.  IIMC’s certification program gives points for having completed a bachelor’s 
or master's degree which suggests that college is not an absolute qualification.  See Int’l Inst. Mun. Clerks, 
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healthcare, retirement, and other benefits, in addition to competitive salaries.64  Jobs with 
benefits and long-term job security are not easily replaced in this economy.  And for the 
religious objector who is the primary breadwinner for her household, the objector must 
also weigh the costs to her family as well.65 
¶25 Dismissal is likely to be costly to objectors in other ways, too.  Many long-time 
employees have built up retirement and other benefits that would be wiped out or 
significantly curtailed if they exit rather than violate a religious conviction.  The 
Massachusetts State Retirement Plan (SERS) illustrates precisely what is at stake for 
employees who are unable to continue in their roles without accommodation.   
Massachusetts state and local government employees must participate in SERS if they 
work full-time or half-time with benefits.  A defined benefit program, SERS pays in lieu 
of Social Security.  New employees contribute 9% of their gross salary to SERS, while 
employees making over $30,000 contribute 11% of salary, both of which are federal tax-
deferred after a deduction of 1.45% for the Medicare portion of Social Security.66  State 
                                                                                                                                                 
Educational Guidelines: Mission Statement (2010), available at 
http://www.iimc.com/DocumentView.aspx?DID=527. 
64 See infra note 65–68 (discussing retirement benefits). 
65 See Michael Luo, Job Woes Exacting a Toll on Family Life, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 12, 2009, at A1, available 
at http://www.nytimes.com/2009/11/12/us/12families.html?_r=1 (noting studies that have tied drops in 
family income to negative effects on children’s development). 
66 See Univ. of Mass., Human Resources: Retirement Plans, 
http://www.massachusetts.edu/hr/retirement.html (last visited Aug. 20, 2010). 
 In Vermont, employees may receive an early retirement after fifty-five if they have five years of 
creditable service, but the size of the payment shrinks under a complex formula the earlier an employee 
retires.  See VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 24 § 5055(c)–(d) (2010) (“Early retirement.  Any member who has not 
reached his or her normal retirement date but who has completed five years of creditable service, at least 
two and one-half of which have been as a contributor subsequent to joining the system, and who has 
attained age 55 may retire on an early retirement allowance.  Early retirement allowance.  Upon early 
retirement, a member shall receive an early retirement allowance equal to the retirement benefit reduced by 
one-half of one percent for each of the first 120 months, one-sixth of one percent for each of the next 120 
months, one-eighteenth of one percent for each of the next 120 months and one fifty-fourth of one percent 
for each additional month that the member is under the normal age at the time of early retirement.”).   
 In Connecticut, an employee “with 5 years of continuous active service” may retire at any age but the 
retirement benefit is “actuarially reduced” the farther away the employee is from 55.  See RETIREMENT & 
BENEFIT SERV. DIV., CONN. MUNICIPAL EMPLOYEES RETIREMENT SYS. UNIT, CONNECTICUT MUNICIPAL 
EMPLOYEES RETIREMENT SYSTEM: SUMMARY PLAN DESCRIPTION 8 (July 2007), available at 
http://www.osc.state.ct.us/rbsd/cmers/plandoc/MERFSPD7107.pdf (“You are eligible for Normal 
Retirement if: You have attained age 55 with a CMERS participating municipality OR You have not 
attained age 55, but you have a total of 25 years of service, inclusive of aggregate service, consisting of at 
least 5 years of continuous active service or 15 years of non-continuous active service with a CMERS 
participating municipality . . . .  You are eligible for reduced early retirement benefits, regardless of your 
age, if you have completed at least 5 years of continuous active service with a CMERS participating 
municipality.  Your retirement benefit is actuarially reduced in order to account for the probability of a 
longer payout period resulting from your early retirement.  The amount of the reduction depends on how 
far away you are from age 55.”).  See also Office of State Comptroller, State of Connecticut, Early 
Retirement Factors Fact Sheet, http://www.osc.state.ct.us/rbsd/cmers/plandoc/ERetFact.pdf (last visited 
Sept. 3, 2010) (providing percentages of salary received by early retirees).   
 In New Hampshire, “service retirement” is available to active employees age sixty or older with no 
minimum service required, with the pension equal to the employee’s average final compensation (taken 
from their “three highest-paid years of membership service”) “divided by 60 multiplied by creditable 
service.”  New Hampshire Retirement System, Members: Service Credit, 
http://www.nhrs.org/members/serviceCredit.aspx (last visited Aug. 20, 2010).  An employee is eligible for 
early retirement with 10 years of creditable service if they are 50–59, or if younger and have amassed 20 
years of creditable service and their age plus service equals 70 years.  New Hampshire Retirement System, 
Members: Early Service Retirement, http://www.nhrs.org/members/earlyretirement.aspx (last visited Aug. 
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employees can draw a pension at age fifty-five if they have ten years of full-time service.  
They may also draw a pension at any age after twenty years of full-time service. 
¶26 The percentage of salary a retiree receives depends on their age and years of service 
at the time of exit.67  An employee who leaves employment before accruing ten years of 
service sees any retirement she would have collected vanish.  But even longer-term 
employees take a hit if they leave their job rather than violate their religious beliefs.  An 
employee who exits after ten years of service, at age fifty-five, receives fifteen percent of 
their highest three years of consecutive pay.  But had the employee continued in their role 
for another ten years, and retired at sixty-five, they would have received twenty-five 
percent.68   
¶27 At the very least, these costs to individuals who have seen the social and moral 
landscape shift beneath them suggest that employees who worked in state licensure 
offices prior to recognition of same-sex marriage should be grandfathered in.  The 
equities particularly favor grandfathering existing employees because, as Part III.B 
explains, giving an exemption is relatively costless to the government and other 
employees, and because the exemption imposes no hardship on same-sex couples, as Part 
III.A shows.  Grandfathering these employees recognizes their settled expectations69 and 
acknowledges just how harsh the penalty for religious objection will be for many.   
¶28 Although the case for exempting new hires is less compelling, the small number of 
predicted collisions between an employee’s religious convictions and the demands of the 
job also favors an exemption.  As the next part explains, meaningful religious liberty 
exemptions for employees, both new and old, would allow them to have valuable 
opportunities for public employment without harming same-sex couples. 
III. THE COST OF ACCOMMODATIONS 
¶29 I and a number of religious liberty scholars have argued for a “hardship” exemption 
that balances two competing concerns: marriage equality and religious liberty.70  This 
                                                                                                                                                 
20, 2010).  
 In Iowa, a “vested” employee may take early retirement if they have reached age 55.  The Early 
Retirement monthly allowance shrinks by 0.25 percentage points for each month before normal retirement 
age (based on age and years of service).  This early retirement adjustment does not apply if you qualify for 
normal or disability retirement, or if you retire under the Special Service formula. 
 Normal retirement age occurs upon the earlier of: (a) Age 65, (b) Age 62 with 20 or more years of 
covered employment (62/20), or (c) When years of service plus the employee’s age equals or exceeds 88.  
IOWA PUB. EMPLOYEES’ RETIREMENT SYS., MEMBER HANDBOOK: SUMMARY OF IPERS RETIREMENT PLAN 
42 (May 2009), available at http://www.ipers.org/publications/members/pdf/memberhandbook.pdf.  
67 See University of Massachusetts, Massachusetts Group 1 Retirement Percentage Chart, 
http://media.umassp.edu/massedu/hr/Retirementchart%20(2).pdf (last visited Sept. 3, 2010). 
68 Id.  An employee of twenty years who leaves employment receives twenty percent.  Had they continued 
working until sixty-five, this percentage would leap to fifty percent.  An employee who has worked for the 
state for forty years and has reached sixty-five receives eighty percent.   
69 See Steven Shavell, On Optimal Legal Change, Past Behavior, and Grandfathering, 37 J. LEGAL STUD. 
37, 38 (2008) (arguing that grandfathering—“allowing noncompliance for parties already participating in 
an activity and complying with rules in the past”—should often be employed). 
70 Two groups of legal scholars have worked in tandem to craft and advocate for the proposed Marriage 
Conscience Protection.  One group consists of myself together with Thomas C. Berg of the University of 
St. Thomas School of Law (Minnesota), Carl H. Esbeck of the University of Missouri School of Law, 
Edward McGlynn Gaffney, Jr. of Valparaiso University School of Law, Richard W. Garnett of the 
University of Notre Dame Law School, and Marc D. Stern, Acting Co-Executive Director/General Counsel 
of the American Jewish Congress.  See Letter to Chet Culver, supra note 7, at 11 n.36 (regarding Religious 
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exemption serves the important purpose of clarifying where one person’s rights end and 
another’s begin.  This part first walks through the mechanics of the proposed hardship 
exemption, illustrating that same-sex couples would not bear the cost of another’s 
religious convictions.  Using the real world experience of marriage licensure offices in 
Massachusetts, this part argues that an exemption would impose at most a scant burden 
on the government or an objector’s co-workers. 
A. No Hardship to Same-Sex Couples  
¶30 The proposed accommodation for which I and others have advocated, the 
“Marriage Conscience Protection,” contained in Appendix B, would provide in relevant 
part: 
(b) Individuals and small businesses protected.  
(1) Except as provided in paragraph (b)(2), no individual, sole 
proprietor, or small business shall be required 
(A) to provide goods or services that assist or promote the 
solemnization or celebration of any marriage, or provide 
counseling or  other services that directly facilitate the perpetuation 
of any marriage;  
. . . .  
(C) . . . if providing such goods, services, benefits, or housing 
would cause such individuals or sole proprietors, or owners of such 
small businesses, to violate their sincerely held religious beliefs. 
(2) Paragraph (b)(1) shall not apply if 
 . . . .  
(B) in the case of an individual who is a government employee or 
official, if another government employee or official is not promptly 
available and willing to provide the requested government service 
without inconvenience or delay.71 
                                                                                                                                                 
Conscience and Same-Sex Marriage in Iowa and giving academic and organizational affiliations for 
identification purposes only, and noting that the universities and organizations that employ the signers take 
no position on these issues) (on file with author).  The second group, led by Douglas Laycock of the 
University of Michigan School of Law, consists of Andrew Koppelman of Northwestern University Law 
School, Michael Perry of Emory University School of Law, and Marc D. Stern, Acting Co-Executive 
Director/General Counsel of the American Jewish Cong.  See Letter from Robin Fretwell Wilson et al., to 
Sen. Richard James Codey, New Jersey 3 (Dec. 5, 2009) (on file with author) (regarding Religious Liberty 
Implications of Same-Sex Marriage and noting that each signer signed in their individual capacity and no 
university or organization takes a position on the issues addressed in the letter).  
71 Letter from Thomas C. Berg, Carl H. Esbeck, Richard W. Garnett & Robin Fretwell Wilson to Sen. Paul 
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¶31 This provision addresses government employees who process the paperwork 
necessary to marry, issue the license, or preside over the civil ceremony.  (Elsewhere I 
have addressed exemptions for sole proprietors or small businesses, such as the wedding 
photographer or flower shop.72)  
¶32 The proposed Marriage Conscience Protection allows government employees or 
officials who serve in ministerial or ceremonial roles to refuse to provide a service only if 
another willing provider is available.  In this way, the proposed Marriage Conscience 
Protection does not permit a government clerk to act as a chokepoint on the path to 
marriage for same-sex couples.   
¶33 Many commentators are rightly concerned about conferring upon religious 
objectors an absolute, unqualified exemption to facilitating same-sex marriage.  
Professors Lupu and Tuttle, for instance, observe elsewhere in this volume that: 
[T]he political community has a legitimate interest in ensuring that all 
people have equal access to publicly available goods and services, whether 
provided by the state, commercial entities, or others.  This interest 
primarily arises from concern about those who are excluded from such 
benefits.  Exclusion may imperil health and safety, limit opportunities for 
personal development, deny political and social equality, or impose 
psychic distress.  State policies protecting against such exclusion also 
express the political community’s concerns about its own character and 
experience, because such exclusion may result in segregation and 
conflict.73   
The Marriage Conscience Protection proposed here is not an absolute exemption for 
government employees, nor have I proposed such unfettered discretion in the past.74 
                                                                                                                                                 
A. Sarlo, New Jersey (Dec. 2, 2009), available at http://mirrorofjustice.blogs.com/files/nj_ltr.doc. 
72 See Wilson, Matters of Conscience, supra note 18, at 100–102; Robin Fretwell Wilson, Same-Sex 
Marriage and Religious Liberty: Life After Prop 8, 14 NEXUS 101 (2009). 
73 Lupu & Tuttle, supra note 2, at 280–81 (emphasis added). 
74 In an early work of mine to which Professors Lupu and Tuttle are responding, I argued that “one way to 
balance competing moral claims is to limit the ability to refuse to instances where a hardship will not 
occur.”  See Wilson, Matters of Conscience, supra note 18, at 99.  I specifically noted, “if the objector is 
the only celebrant available, the denial is tantamount to a denial of access to marriage, . . . a good 
guaranteed by the Constitution.”  Id. at 99–100.  Recognizing “the unique constitutional status of 
marriage,” I concluded that states seeking to provide an accommodation to government employees would 
“face a choice—bar conscientious refusals entirely or provide a hardship exemption to the ability of the 
objecting clerk to refuse.”  Id. at 100.   
 Even as to objectors who could not act as a roadblock to marriage, such as those who provide 
commercial services in the marketplace (i.e., bakers), I argued for a hardship exemption, namely, “the 
ability to refuse based on religious or moral objections, but limit[ed] . . . to instances where a significant 
hardship to the requesting parties will not occur.”  Id. at 101. 
 Professors Lupu and Tuttle understand that the hardship exemption that I sketched in my earlier work, 
which forms the backbone for this Article, is bounded by hardship to same-sex couples.  As they explain, 
“Under such a regime, religious objectors would be exempted from a duty to serve same-sex couples, 
unless a specific refusal of service would impose a ‘significant hardship’ on those seeking the service.”  
Lupu & Tuttle, supra note 2, at 288 (critiquing the “scholarly works of Wilson and Laycock”).  
Nonetheless, they tag exemptions qualified by hardship as denying access to marriage: 
Because the state creates this benefit, [marriage], denial of access to marriage has a very 
different character from the state’s denial of funding for, or other restrictions on, abortion 
services.   




¶34 Indeed, the conditional nature of the proposed Marriage Conscience Protection is 
by deliberate design: an absolute exemption for government employees or officials—
unqualified by hardship—could erect a roadblock to marriage for same-sex couples, at 
least some of the time.  For example, an accommodation that absolutely exempts clerks 
from processing an application for a marriage license would hobble a couple’s access in a 
number of foreseeable circumstances.  This might occur when a solitary clerk is available 
in a hundred mile radius and he or she objects for religious reasons to facilitating a same-
sex marriage.  An absolute roadblock would also be erected when an otherwise willing 
clerk is unavailable due to illness or other reason, leaving no other willing clerk to assist 
the couple.  The proposed Marriage Conscience Protection forestalls such hardships to 
same-sex couples.75   
¶35 As with any rule that seeks to balance two competing interests, the proposed 
hardship exemption will involve some line drawing; specifically, what will count as 
“promptly” or “inconvenience” or “delay.”  Such line drawing is best left to the 
legislative process since different states may want to make different choices depending 
on the facts on the ground in that state; for instance, how rural or urban the state is, how 
many state offices process the necessary paperwork, or the length of the requisite waiting 
period to marry in that state.  Such waiting periods vary significantly from state to state.76 
¶36 That said, asking same-sex couples to wait several days for a license that 
heterosexual couples would receive the same day would not be “prompt.”  State 
legislators may want to take the mandatory waiting period in their own jurisdiction as a 
guide for deciding what is “prompt.”77  Of course, one can imagine that some legislatures 
will choose to enact legislation without explicitly defining certain terms, such as 
“prompt,” as they routinely do in other statutes—and leave it to the courts to construe 
those terms.   
¶37 To be clear, the proposed Marriage Conscience Protection will strike many 
religious objectors as cold comfort.  This is so because in a straight-up contest between 
religious liberty and marriage equality, religious liberty yields under this construction.  
Cabining the ability to object to only those situations when no hardship for same-sex 
couples would result is principled: the state should not confer the right to marry with one 
                                                                                                                                                 
. . .  
Thus, under both the equal protection clause of the 14th Amendment, and related equality 
provisions of state constitutions, such state officers have duties of equal respect to all persons 
within the state.  It is very difficult to see how one can square such a duty with a right, religion-
based or otherwise, to refuse to provide public services to a particular class of individuals.  
Id. at 293-94 (emphasis added). 
 As I explain in the text of this Article, I share Professors Lupu and Tuttle’s concerns about erecting any 
absolute roadblock to marriage.   
75 By avoiding such hardships to same-sex couples, the proposed Marriage Conscience Protection should 
survive challenges that it violates the fundamental right to marry as well.  See infra Part IV (discussing the 
U.S. Supreme Court’s jurisprudence on marriage restrictions). 
76 Compare S.C. CODE ANN. § 20-1-220 (2006) (“No marriage license may be issued unless a written 
application has been filed . . . at least twenty-four hours before the issuance of the license.”), with WIS. 
STAT. § 765.08 (2007) (“No marriage license may be issued within 5 days of application for the marriage 
license.”). 
77 States could also enact different waiting periods for same-sex couples to place them “in the same position 
in term[s] of access to marriage.”  See Wilson, Matters of Conscience, supra note 18, at 99. 
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hand and then take it back with the other by enacting broad, unqualified religious 
objections that could operate to bar same-sex couples from marrying.   
¶38 While the proposed Marriage Conscience Protection does not help every objector in 
every instance, the exemption still has value.  As the next subpart illustrates, a hardship 
exemption likely will allow the vast majority of objectors to step aside.78 
It is worth noting that the proposed Marriage Conscience Protection makes no distinction 
among marriages to which a religious objector may object.  In this sense, it does not 
distinguish on the basis of sexual orientation.  A religious liberty exemption that permits 
objections only to same-sex marriages would raise a number of concerns, including 
whether it makes an impermissible classification on the basis of sexual orientation.79  Of 
course, it is possible that government employees might seek to step aside from facilitating 
other kinds of marriage on religious grounds—such as a second marriage or even an 
interracial marriage.  It is unlikely, however, that the proposed Marriage Conscience 
Protection will release a floodgate of religious objections to a variety of marriages, since 
after Loving v. Virginia only two documented cases of a clerk or judge refusing to issue a 
marriage license to an interracial couple can be found.80  Given the paucity of religious 
objections to facilitating marriages before the recognition of same-sex marriage, it seems 
preferable to not limit the proposed exemption only to same-sex marriage.81 
B. Minimal Burden on the Government or Co-workers 
¶39 Of course, exemptions may be costly not only to couples applying for licenses, but 
to the government office as employer or to an objector’s co-workers.82  Yet a new study 
by the Williams Institute at the University of California at Los Angeles suggests that any 
exemption is likely to be easily accommodated at minimal cost.  In Massachusetts, which 
has had the longest experience with same-sex marriage in the United States, same-sex 
marriage licenses comprise a small fraction of the office’s total work.  As Table 1 shows, 
in 2004, the first year that Massachusetts issued same-sex marriage licenses it 
                                                 
78 See infra Part III.B (arguing that few cases of hardship to same-sex couples would actually arise).   
79 See, e.g., Wilson, The Calculus of Accommodation, supra note 16, at Part VI (discussing § 40-406(e) of 
the D.C. Council’s proposed same-sex marriage statute, which would have provided that “a religious 
society, or a nonprofit organization which is operated, supervised, or controlled by or in conjunction with a 
religious society, shall not be required to provide services, accommodations, facilities, or goods for a 
purpose related to the solemnization or celebration of a same-sex marriage, or the promotion of same-sex 
marriage through religious programs, counseling, courses, or retreats, that is in violation of the religious 
society’s beliefs”).  Cf. Martha Minow, Should Religious Groups Be Exempt from Civil Rights Laws?, 48 
B.C. L. REV. 781, 786 (2007) (introducing many of the complications that arise when religious groups seek 
exemptions to civil rights laws). 
80 See Wilson, Matters of Conscience, supra note 18, at 96 n.191 (reporting that as of 2008, there were “no 
[judicial] cases after Loving v. Virginia in which clerks refused to issue licenses to, or judges refused to 
marry, interracial couples” but finding that a 1994 news story reported that an interracial couple threatened 
to sue Chester County, Tennessee, when county officials refused to marry them).  The second instance 
occurred more recently when a Louisiana Justice of the Peace refused to issue a marriage license to an 
interracial couple, although the refusal was not based on religious grounds.  Interracial Couple Denied 
Marriage License By Louisiana Justice of the Peace, MSNBC.COM, Oct. 15, 2009, 
http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/33332436/.   
81 Legislators may worry that the proposed exemption would authorize a government employee to refuse to 
assist an interracial couple, citing religious objections.  Although past experience suggests such refusals 
may be rare, legislators concerned about this possibility may wish explicitly to bar objections to facilitating 
interracial marriages, in keeping with other legislative efforts to erase racial distinctions. 
82 See infra Part V (discussing the requirements of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964). 
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experienced a burst of requests from same-sex couples.  Over a 7.5 month period these 
requests totaled 6121, or 18.37% of all licenses issued by the Commonwealth that year.  
Since 2004, the rate of same-sex marriage license requests has flattened out to a level that 
likely approximates the year-in, year-out demand.  “In 2005, 2006, 2007 and the first nine 
months of 2008, there were 6,236 gay weddings, according to statistics from the state 
Department of Public Health.”83   
 
Table 184 
Year Opposite Sex Same-Sex Total Percentage 
2004 27,196 6121 33,317 18.37
2005 37,447 2060 39,507 5.21
2006 36,550 1442 37,993 3.80
2007 36,373 1524 37,897 4.02
2008 20,070 1210 23,292 5.19
Total 159,636 12,177 172,006 7.08
 
¶40 Presumably, the spike in 2004 applications represents both pent-up demand from 
Massachusetts same-sex couples who previously were locked out of marriage and a first-
in-time bump resulting from out-of-state couples who flocked to Massachusetts as a “gay 
marriage Mecca.”85  Because five states now recognize same-sex marriage, and because 
same-sex marriage has now been recognized for half a decade in Massachusetts, one 
would expect the numbers of same-sex marriage applications to flatten out, as they have.  
This stabilized demand suggests that staffing around a religious objection may indeed not 
be very taxing on either the clerk’s office as an entity or a religious objector’s co-
workers.86  As a fraction of all marriage license requests across the state, same-sex 
marriage license requests fluctuated between 3.8 and 5.21% a year from 2005 to 2008.87  
¶41 Indeed, the Williams Institute found that “most of the Commonwealth’s 351 
communities have recorded same-sex marriages in the single digits since that first 
year.”88  This is borne out by the statistics compiled by the Williams Institute for the 
number of same-sex license requests in four Massachusetts communities: Northampton, 
Springfield, West Springfield, and Westfield, shown in Table 2. 
 
 
                                                 
83 Pat Cahill, 5 Years After Same-Sex Marriage Became Legal in Massachusetts, Studies Find Economic 
Benefit, THE REPUBLICAN, May 30, 2009, available at 
http://www.masslive.com/news/index.ssf/2009/05/5_years_after_samesex_marriage.html. 
84 Id. 
85 Id.  One possible low-cost solution is to allow objectors to take accumulated vacation in periods of pent-
up demand, reducing the number of collisions between the religious objector and the new demands placed 
upon the clerk’s office.  Obviously, this short-term solution will not solve every problem but may 
significantly reduce their frequency at a time of predictably high demand. 
86 See infra Part V (discussing the requirements of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964). 
87 Cahill, supra note 83 (reporting statistics for 2008 through September only). 
88 Id. 













Northampton 338/469  78/336 104/258 91/306 n/a
Springfield 85/845 22/884 23/870 35/846 58/n/a
West 
Springfield 
10/177 7/181 3/168 5/139 3/n/a
Westfield 15/295 4/249 4/265 8/255 5/n/a
 
¶42 Of those four, Northampton’s office was the busiest, averaging 91 requests per year 
from 2005 through 2007.  An employee in the Northampton Clerk’s Office suggested that 
the number of same-sex marriage license requests is high in that city due to its reputation 
as being “very accepting” and friendly to the lesbian and gay community.90  By contrast, 
Springfield averaged considerably fewer, only 34.5 requests per year between 2005 and 
2008, while West Springfield and Westfield averaged a mere 4.5 and 5.25 requests per 
year, respectively.  These statistics suggest that at the high end, an office is likely to 
process no more than two same-sex license requests in a given week,91 while at the low 
end, most offices will not have a single same-sex license request in any given week.92 
¶43 Localities in Massachusetts staff the clerk’s office with a varying number of 
employees.  Of the communities referenced in Table 2, Northampton has three employees 
in the clerk’s office capable of handling marriage license requests,93 while West 
Springfield has four,94 Westfield three,95 and Springfield eleven.96  Northampton is the 
office with the greatest likelihood of a collision between an objector and a same-sex 
couple, with an average of ninety-one requests a year spread across only three employees.  
But this office does not process marriage license requests on the spot,97 making it feasible 
to direct the couple in advance to see a non-objecting clerk when they come in, reducing 
the chance of a collision.   
¶44 Moreover, there is good reason to believe that religious objectors will be few and 
far between.  The people who feel compelled to seek a religious accommodation 
presumably hold two beliefs: one, a religious objection to same-sex marriage, and two, 
the belief that facilitation itself makes one culpable.  After California’s Proposition 8, a 
                                                 
89 Id. 
90 Telephone Interview by Joe Mercer, Research Assistant, with Lynn Simmons, Northampton Clerk’s 
Office (Jan. 14, 2010) [hereinafter Northampton Clerk’s Office Interview].  The community stopped 
distinguishing same-sex from other marriages in 2008. 
91 This estimate uses the average from Northampton.  The Northampton Clerk’s Office is open fifty-two 
weeks per year.  Interview with Sissy Horrigan, Northampton City Clerk (Jan. 14, 2010). 
92 Using the averages from Westfield and West Springfield.  
93 Northampton Clerk’s Office Interview, supra note 90. 
94 Telephone Interview by Joe Mercer with Otto Frizelle, West Springfield Clerk’s Office (Jan. 14, 2010) 
[hereinafter West Springfield Clerk’s Office Interview]. 
95 Telephone Interview by Joe Mercer with Karen Fanion, Westfield City Clerk (Jan. 14, 2010). 
96 Telephone interview by Steve Mammarella with Springfield City Hall Clerk Chantal Keating (Sep. 15, 
2010). 
97 Northampton requires a preliminary visit or phone call prior to receiving the license.  Northampton 
Clerk’s Office Interview, supra note 90.  Of the five offices contacted, no other appears to use this process. 
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poll by the Pew Forum found that forty-four percent of people believed that 
homosexuality is either morally acceptable or that it is not a moral issue at all, while 
forty-nine percent indicated it is morally wrong.  Eleven percent of those who believed 
that homosexuality is morally wrong still favored same-sex marriage.98  Fifty-three 
percent of all respondents were opposed to same-sex marriage, but a clear majority, fifty-
seven percent, supported giving same-sex couples the right to enter into civil unions.99  
Presumably, those who believe same-sex relationships are acceptable or not a moral 
issue, or who support same-sex marriage rights, are unlikely to have a religious objection 
to facilitating a same-sex marriage.100  Other polling by the Pew Forum on the role of 
religion in determining how a voter voted on Proposition 8 suggests that individuals 
“who say they attend worship services at least once a week [were] much more likely to 
oppose same-sex marriage (sixty-nine percent) than those who say they attend less often 
(forty-five percent).”101  Generally, individuals with this degree of religious participation 
comprise a distinct minority in the United States.102 
¶45 Office staffing also influences whether religious objections are likely to occur—
that is, the religious objector will not always be the clerk to whom a same-sex couple first 
presents.  Assume that an office has eleven clerks and does not streamline applicants or 
otherwise manage the workflow.  If a same-sex couple is just as likely to present to any 
given clerk as to any other, the probability that the couple approaches any objector by 
chance is approximately 9.1% if the office contains a single religious objector.103  On the 
other hand, in an office with two clerks, one of whom is an objector, the probability that 
the couple approaches the objector by chance is fifty percent.104 
¶46 The idea of exemptions rankles critics not only because they assume that 
exemptions will be costly but because of concerns about fairness105—namely, the 
possibility that the objector somehow receives a better deal than her co-workers.  All of 
the clerk’s offices contacted in connection with this Article described the volume of work 
in their office as very high.  Work is spread across all the available personnel with no one 
having any real down-time.106  Because these offices are operating near maximum 
                                                 
98 PEW FORUM ON RELIGION & PUBLIC LIFE, MAJORITY CONTINUES TO SUPPORT CIVIL UNIONS: MOST 
STILL OPPOSE SAME-SEX MARRIAGE (Oct. 2009), http://pewforum.org/docs/?DocID=481. 
99 Id. 
100 Notably, younger respondents, 58%, favored same-sex marriage.  Id. (reporting support for same-sex 
marriage among 18–29 year-olds).  
101 DAVID MASCI, PEW FORUM ON RELIGION & PUBLIC LIFE, PUBLIC OPINION ON GAY MARRIAGE: 
OPPONENTS CONSISTENTLY OUTNUMBER SUPPORTERS (July 2009), http://pewforum.org/docs/?DocID=424.   
See also Poll: Calif. Gay Marriage Ban Driven by Religion, USA TODAY, Dec. 4, 2008, 
http://www.usatoday.com/news/religion/2008-12-04-gay-poll_N.htm (reporting that along with economic 
status, “religious convictions played a greater role than race and age in determining” whether a voter 
supported California’s Proposition 8). 
102 “A quarter (27%) of adult Americans claim that they attend church once a week or more often.”  Press 
Release, Harris Interactive, More Americans Believe in the Devil, Hell and Angels than in Darwin’s 
Theory of Evolution (Dec. 10, 2008), http://www.harrisinteractive.com/harris_poll/index.asp?PID=982. 
103 Obviously, the probabilities increase if other clerks would also object. 
104 According to an employee in the Northampton Clerk’s Office, same-sex couples gravitate to the 
Northampton office when they have a choice because the office is seen as gay-friendly.  Northampton 
Clerk’s Office Interview, supra note 90.  Compare 2004 applications in Table 2. 
105 See supra note 42 (quoting Councilman David Catania). 
106 Clerks in the Northampton Clerk’s Office also process birth records, marriage records, death records, 
business certifications, physician registrations, dog licenses, fishing and game licenses, and handle 
elections.  Telephone Interview with Wendy Mazza, Northampton Town Clerk (Jan. 12, 2010).  Clerks in 
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capacity, an objector who passes a same-sex license request onto a co-worker will have to 
move immediately to other work.107  In effect, the objector swaps one assignment, the 
same-sex marriage license application, for the next piece of work that must be done.  
Thus, the co-worker covering the same-sex marriage application is not forced to shoulder 
additional responsibilities.108  In this way, objectors will not be “rewarded” for their 
religious objection with a lighter workload.109  Moreover, because there is no reduced 
workload reward for maintaining a religious objection, insincere objectors will have no 
incentive to seek an exemption.  All in all, allowing a religious objector to step aside 
from facilitating same-sex marriage licenses should not be very taxing to the office or the 
objector’s co-workers, because there will be very few instances in any year where one 
employee will have to cover for another.  The number of collisions should be so small as 
to be unproblematic. 
IV. BURDENING MARRIAGE 
¶47 Some assert that: 
[U]nder both the Equal Protection Clause of the 14th Amendment, and 
related equality provisions of state constitutions, [all executive and 
judicial] state officers have duties of equal respect to all persons within the 
state.  It is very difficult to see how one can square such a duty with a 
right, religion-based or otherwise, to refuse to provide public services to a 
particular class of individuals.110 
¶48 Because state officers issue licenses to marry, this position seems to assert that 
religious exemptions to same-sex marriage laws would impermissibly burden a same-sex 
                                                                                                                                                 
the West Springfield and Westfield Clerk’s Office handle marriage licenses and perform the other clerical 
responsibilities.  Email from Diane Foley, City Clerk, Springfield, Massachusetts to Joseph Mercer (Jan. 
12, 2010); Email from Karen M. Fanion, City Clerk, Westfield, Massachusetts to Joseph Mercer (Jan. 12, 
2010). 
107 While the clerks contacted in connection with this Article did not quantify the number of licenses 
processed by religious objectors versus their co-workers, they did indicate that all employees were being 
fully utilized.   
108 Eugene Volokh, Intermediate Questions of Religious Exemptions—A Research Agenda with Test Suites, 
21 CARDOZO L. REV. 595, 608 (1999) (discussing U.S. Supreme Court cases that arguably suggest that “the 
Establishment Clause may impose another limitation on religious exemptions—‘In accommodating 
religious activities, the legislature should not impose disproportionate costs on other citizens or 
activities.’”).   
 Additional workload may not be the only cost to co-workers.  A “covering” co-worker might resent the 
fact that she is performing a task that the objector would otherwise have performed, despite the fact that 
both are being fully utilized.  See supra note 21 (discussing feelings of “victimization” reported by co-
workers in Ladele v. London Borough of Islington).  If such feelings, without more, rise to the level of an 
impermissible hardship on co-workers, as discussed in Part V, query whether the law would ever permit a 
religious exemption allowing an employee to decline to perform a task she would otherwise perform. 
109 Contrast the quip made by many waiters and waitresses who “started smoking to get the extra breaks.” 
110 Lupu & Tuttle, supra note 2, at 294. 
N O R T H W E S T E R N  J O U R N AL  O F  L A W  A N D  S O C I A L  PO L I C Y  [ 2 0 1 0  
 
340 
couple’s ability to marry111 in violation of the couple’s rights to equal protection and 
perhaps due process.112  
¶49 There are two problems with this claim.  First, it misunderstands how the proposed 
Marriage Conscience Protection would operate.  As Part III explained, under the 
proposed exemption a religious objector may step aside only if another willing clerk can 
perform the service.  Thus, same-sex couples receive a license as “promptly” as 
heterosexual couples.113  As a consequence, no same-sex couple or class of persons is 
ever denied a public service.  Further, even though the state may impose considerable 
inconveniences on persons who seek to marry short of significant interference, as this 
part explains, same-sex couples who receive a license and civil ceremony as “promptly” 
as heterosexual couples would not be burdened by an exemption, let alone experience the 
kind of “significant interference” that triggers an Equal Protection violation.114  
¶50 Second, as explained below, the constitutional requirement of Equal Protection 
demands that no person experience “significant interference” when accessing marriage, 
not that a couple has a right to have each and every employee in a government office 
process their license.  In fact, as long as a couple does not experience significant 
interference in receiving a service giving them access to marriage—for example, the 
necessary license—it would not matter whether a specific employee was exempted from 
assisting the couple. 
                                                 
111 Id. at 293 (“Because the state creates this benefit, [marriage], denial of access to marriage has a very 
different character from the state’s denial of funding for, or other restrictions on, abortion services.”) 
(emphasis added).   
112 Compare Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 12 (1967) (holding that restricting the freedom to marry on 
racial grounds violates the Equal Protection and Due Process clauses), with Zablocki v. Redhail, 434 U.S. 
374, 383 (1978) (noting that the law at issue in Loving “arbitrarily deprived the couple of a fundamental 
liberty protected by the Due Process Clause, the freedom to marry”). 
113 See supra Part III.A (discussing the meaning of terms like “promptly”); Proposed Marriage Conscience 
Protection § (b)(2)(B), infra Appendix B.   
114 This Article seeks only to answer whether a hardship exemption violates equal protection or due process 
by frustrating the fundamental right to marry.  Of course, any statute may be struck for employing an 
impermissible classification.  On its face, the proposed Marriage Conscience Protection treats all religious 
objections to facilitating marriages alike.  See supra Part III.A (discussing reasons why the proposed 
Marriage Conscience Protection is not limited only to facilitating same-sex marriages).  For a discussion of 
how classifications based on race, gender, and sexual orientation receive different levels of scrutiny, see 
Minow, supra note 79. 
 Moreover, an exemption may be challenged on other grounds, such as the Establishment Clause.  See 2 
KENT GREENAWALT, RELIGION AND THE CONSTITUTION: ESTABLISHMENT AND FAIRNESS (2008).  Professor 
Greenawalt notes: 
Among the most vexed questions in the law of the religion clauses is when a legal measure that 
might otherwise be justified as an accommodation to free exercise is instead a forbidden 
establishment of religion . . . . Scholars have fairly observed that the Supreme Court has given us 
no theory, or no tenable theory, for drawing the line between permissible accommodation and 
impermissible establishment.   
Id. at 336.  The question about “when a legal measure that might otherwise be justified as an 
accommodation to free exercise [instead slips over into] a forbidden establishment of religion . . . [is] 
[a]mong the most vexed questions in the law of the religion clauses. . . .  [T]he Supreme Court has given us 
no theory, or no tenable theory, for drawing the line between permissible accommodation and 
impermissible establishment.”  Id. at 336.  Nonetheless, “the Court has consistently assumed . . . that some 
accommodations in terms of religious exercise are all right.”  Id. at 339.  While a complete analysis of what 
constitutes an acceptable measure is beyond the scope of this Article, the Court on multiple occasions has 
suggested that Title VII’s call for measured accommodations of religious objectors would not violate the 
Establishment Clause.  See infra Part V.C.   
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¶51 The “significant interference” test derives from a series of cases testing marriage 
restrictions, beginning with the U.S. Supreme Court’s 1967 decision in Loving v. 
Virginia.115  There, the Court invalidated Virginia’s anti-miscegenation statute outlawing 
interracial marriages because it violated the Equal Protection Clause and the Due Process 
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.116  Under the statute, a white person who wanted 
to marry a black person, and vice versa, had no way around the statutory bar to that 
marriage.  By employing a classification based on race, Virginia violated the Equal 
Protection Clause.117  The statute also erected an absolute bar to marriage, independently 
triggering a due process violation.118  While the lower court correctly observed “that 
marriage is a social relation subject to the State’s police power,” the Court found that 
Virginia could not plausibly claim “that its powers to regulate marriage are unlimited 
notwithstanding the commands of the Fourteenth Amendment.”119  The Court was 
emphatic, however, that the decision did not invalidate all regulation of marriages, only 
those that offend constitutional principles.120 
¶52 Eleven years later in Zablocki v. Redhail,121 the Court struck down a Wisconsin 
statute that prevented child support “deadbeats” from marrying.  The challenged statute 
could not survive strict scrutiny, because it significantly interfered with the fundamental 
right to marry for those in the “affected class.”122  “These persons are absolutely 
prevented from getting married.”123  While some child support debtors might be “able in 
theory to satisfy the statute’s requirements, [they] will be sufficiently burdened by having 
to do so that they will in effect be coerced into forgoing their right to marry.”124  Even 
those who comply with the statute “suffer a serious intrusion into their freedom of choice 
in an area in which we have held such freedom to be fundamental.”125  
¶53 When a statute significantly interferes with a fundamental right, such as the right to 
marry, the Zablocki Court explained, it must be supported by “sufficiently important state 
interests and [be] closely tailored to effectuate only those interests.”126  Wisconsin’s 
poorly drawn statute failed to advance the state’s purported interest—financial support of 
children—since the statute did nothing to put more money in the hands of custodial 
parents.127 
                                                 
115 Loving, 388 U.S. at 12. 
116 Id. at 11–12. 
117 Id. 
118 Id. at 12. 
119 Id. 
120 Id. 
121 434 U.S. 374 (1978). 
122 Id. at 390–91. 
123 Id. at 387. 
124 Id. 
125 Id. 
126 Id. at 388. 
127 Id. at 390.  The Court noted that Wisconsin’s statute “merely prevents the applicant from getting 
married, without delivering any money at all into the hands of the applicant’s poor children.  More 
importantly, regardless of the applicant’s ability or willingness to meet the statutory requirements, the State 
already has numerous other means for exacting compliance with support obligations, means that are at least 
as effective as the instant statute’s and yet do not impinge upon the right to marry.”  Id.  Further, it found 
the statute to be both “grossly underinclusive” and “substantially overinclusive as well.”  The statute was 
underinclusive because it did “not limit in any way new financial commitments by the applicant other than 
those arising out of the contemplated marriage.  The statutory classification is substantially overinclusive as 
well: Given the possibility that the new spouse will actually better the applicant’s financial situation, by 
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¶54 Although Wisconsin overreached, the Court made clear again that the state may 
legitimately regulate marriage, both substantively and procedurally.  The Court 
explained:   
[W]e do not mean to suggest that every state regulation which relates in 
any way to the incidents of or prerequisites for marriage must be subjected 
to rigorous scrutiny.  To the contrary, reasonable regulations that do not 
significantly interfere with decisions to enter the marital relationship may 
legitimately be imposed.128  
Justice Stewart suggested a number of permissible areas of regulation in his concurrence:  
Surely, for example, a state may legitimately say that no one can marry his 
or her sibling, that no one can marry who is not at least 14 years old, that 
no one can marry without first passing an examination for venereal 
disease, or that no one can marry who has a living husband or wife.129   
Like Justice Stewart, Justice Powell also recognized that marriage is “an area which 
traditionally has been subject to pervasive state regulation.”130 
¶55 Crucially, the majority distinguished Wisconsin’s statute from one upheld by the 
Court in the same term.131  In Califano v. Jobst,132 the Court concluded that a statute 
terminating insurance benefits to a disabled dependent child, Jobst, under the Social 
Security Act because he married a woman not entitled to these benefits did not 
significantly interfere with the choice to marry.133  This was so even though the couple 
received $20 less per month after marrying than Jobst received prior to his marriage.134  
The Court acknowledged that this financial hit “may have an impact on a secondary 
beneficiary’s desire to marry, and may make some suitors less welcome than others.”135  
Nonetheless, the statute terminating payments “is not rendered invalid simply because 
some persons who might otherwise have married were deterred by the rule or because 
some who did marry were burdened thereby.”136  Because the interference was not 
significant, the statute did not trigger strict scrutiny.   
                                                                                                                                                 
contributing income from a job or otherwise, the statute in many cases may prevent affected individuals 
from improving their ability to satisfy their prior support obligations.”  Id. 
128 Id. at 386–87. 
129 Id. at 392.    
130 Id. at 396 (Powell, J., concurring). 
131 Id. at 387 n.12.  For Chief Justice Burger, who concurred with the majority in Zablocki, the challenged 
statute represented an “intentional and substantial interference with the right to marry.”  Id. at 391 (Burger, 
J., concurring).  Chief Justice Burger also distinguished the Social Security provision in Jobst because it 
only “indirect[ly] impact[ed]” the decision to marry.  Id. (citing Califano v. Jobst, 434 U.S. 47 (1977)). 
132 434 U.S. 47 (1977). 
133 Id. at 54. 
134 Id. at 57 n.17. 
135 Id. at 58. 
136 Id. at 54.  The Court found that Congress elected to use “age and marital status [] to determine probable 
dependency” to avoid individualized proof of dependency on a case-by-case basis: “A distinction between 
married persons and unmarried persons is of a different character” than “[d]ifferences in race, religion, or 
political affiliation [which] could not rationally justify a difference in eligibility for Social Security 
benefits.”  Id. 
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¶56 As the Zablocki court explained, the “directness and substantiality of the 
interference with the freedom to marry [in Zablocki] distinguish[ed]” it from Jobst:  
[T]he rule terminating benefits upon marriage was not “an attempt to 
interfere with the individual’s freedom to make a decision as important as 
marriage.”  The Social Security provisions placed no direct legal obstacle 
in the path of persons desiring to get married, and . . . there was no 
evidence that the laws significantly discouraged, let alone made 
“practically impossible,” any marriages.  Indeed, the provisions had not 
deterred the individual who challenged the statute from getting married, 
even though he and his wife were both disabled.137     
¶57 The trio of cases, Loving, Zablocki, and Jobst,138 make clear that “reasonable 
regulations that do not significantly interfere with decisions to enter into the marital 
relationship may legitimately be imposed.”139  A marriage restriction challenged on the 
grounds that it violates the fundamental right to marry140 triggers strict scrutiny only if it 
places a “direct legal obstacle in the path of persons desiring to get married.”141  In other 
words, in such challenges, courts never get to strict scrutiny review unless the statute at 
issue makes it very difficult for couples to marry. 
¶58 The bar for constituting a significant interference with the fundamental right to 
marriage is actually quite high.  A long line of cases have upheld nepotism and exogamy 
rules, as well as marriage penalties in subsidy programs and the tax code, against equal 
protection challenges.  In each instance, lower courts employed rational basis review142 
because the regulations at issue did not directly and substantially interfere with the right 
to marry. 
¶59 In Wright v. Metrohealth Medical Center, for example, two public hospital co-
workers married in violation of the hospital’s anti-nepotism policy, forcing one of them 
to transfer jobs.143  The two met while working together on the hospital’s LifeFlight 
emergency medical service.  When they informed the hospital of their impending 
marriage, the administration transferred the husband from Ohio to a facility in 
                                                 
137 Zablocki v. Redhail, 434 U.S. 374, 387 n.12 (1978) (internal citations omitted).  Chief Justice Burger 
also distinguished the Social Security provision in Jobst because it only “indirect[ly] impact[ed]” the 
decision to marry.  Id. at 391. 
138 In Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78 (1987), the Court again affirmed the fundamental right to marry.  There, 
the Court struck a Missouri prison regulation that required compelling reasons—typically pregnancy or the 
birth of an illegitimate child—in order for inmates to gain the prison superintendent’s permission to marry.  
Id.  While “[t]he right to marry, like many other rights, is subject to substantial restrictions as a result of 
incarceration,” there remains “a constitutionally protected marital relationship in the prison context.”  Id. at 
95–96.  In light of this protection, the Court found that these barriers to marriage were not reasonably 
related to the proffered interests of prison security and rehabilitation.  Id. at 98. 
139 Zablocki, 434 U.S. at 386–87 (emphasis added). 
140 See supra note 114 (discussing impermissible classifications and other constitutional challenges). 
141 Zablocki, 434 U.S. at 387 n.12 (internal citations omitted). 
142 Rational basis review requires only that governmental action be rationally related to a legitimate 
government interest; by contrast, strict scrutiny review requires that governmental action further a 
compelling state interest and be narrowly tailored to achieve that interest by using the least restrictive 
means possible.  16A AM. JUR. 2D Constitutional Law § 403 (2010). 
143 58 F.3d 1130, 1132 (6th Cir. 1995). 
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Louisiana.144  Despite the significant penalty—a transfer across the country—the United 
States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit concluded that the hospital’s anti-nepotism 
policy did not “directly and substantially interfere with the fundamental right to marry, 
and thus, we hold that the district court did not err in subjecting the policy to rational 
basis scrutiny.”145    
¶60 In Vaughn v. Lawrenceburg Power System,146 the Sixth Circuit went even further.  
A married couple, both of whom worked for Lawrenceburg Power System (LPS), 
challenged the constitutionality of the company’s exogamy policy which provided that an 
employee’s spouse could not also work for the company.147  One of the wedded pair 
would have to quit working at the company or be terminated.  When neither spouse 
resigned after the marriage, LPS fired both of them.148  Despite the harshness of LPS’s 
policy, the Sixth Circuit found it did not significantly interfere with the right to marry and 
did not trigger strict scrutiny:  
[T]he policy did not bar Jennifer or Keith from getting married, nor did it 
prevent them marrying a large portion of population even in Lawrence 
County.  It only made it economically burdensome to marry a small 
number of those eligible individuals, their fellow employees at LPS.  Once 
Jennifer and Keith decided to marry one another, LPS’s policy became 
onerous for them, but ex ante, it did not greatly restrict their freedom to 
marry or whom to marry. 
Because the “the exogamy rule in itself must be considered a non-oppressive burden on 
the right to marry, [it is] subject only to rational basis review by this court.”149 
¶61 Nor does the treatment of married couples as a single person for purposes of 
agricultural crop subsidy payments significantly interfere with the right to marry.  In 
Women Involved in Farm Economics v. United States Department of Agriculture, a 
national organization challenged a Federal regulation that treated husbands and wives as 
one “person.”150  In reviewing the regulation, the United States Court of Appeals for the 
District of Columbia found that strict scrutiny was “inappropriate because the rule does 
not ‘interfere directly and substantially with the right to marry.’”151  Nor did the rule 
                                                 
144 Id. 
145 Id. at 1135–36 (concluding that the “nepotism policy is necessary to (1) avoid potential conflicts that 
might arise when two closely related persons allow their personal lives to impinge on their professional 
lives, and (2) prevent morale among other workers from deteriorating due to the unique relationship 
between the married co-workers.”).  See also Waters v. Gaston Co., N.C., 57 F.3d 422, 426 (4th Cir. 1995) 
(upholding a similar policy after employing rational basis review, concluding that the restriction advanced  
the interests of “avoiding conflicts of interest between work-related and family-related obligations; 
reducing favoritism or even the appearance of favoritism; preventing family conflicts from affecting the 
workplace; and, by limiting inter-office dating, decreasing the likelihood of sexual harassment in the 
workplace”). 
146 269 F.3d 703 (6th Cir. 2001). 
147 Id. at 706. 
148 Id. at 708–709. 
149 Id. at 712 (concluding that the exogamy rule “(1) prevent[ed] one employee from assuming the role of 
‘spokesperson’ for both, (2) . . . avoid[ed] involving or angering a second employee when an employee is 
reprimanded, (3) and avoid[ed] marital strife or fraternization in the workplace”). 
150 876 F.2d 994 (D.C. Cir. 1989). 
151 Id. at 1004 (quoting Zablocki v. Redhail, 434 U.S. 374, 387 (1978)). 
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“place[] [a] direct legal obstacle in the path of persons desiring to get married.”152  As 
such, the Court limits its inquiry to asking whether “the legislation classif[ies] the person 
it affects in a manner rationally related to legitimate government objectives.”153  
¶62 In Druker v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, a married couple challenged the 
constitutionality of the Federal income tax code’s “marriage penalty” for married couples 
who file separate income tax returns.154  Rather than pay the penalty, the couple divorced 
but continued to cohabitate.  Despite the fact the Drukers would rather divorce than pay 
the marriage penalty, the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit found the 
tax provision did not significantly interfere with the choice to marry.155  “The adverse 
effect of the ‘marriage penalty’ . . . like the effect of the termination of social security 
benefits in Jobst, is merely ‘indirect’; while it may to some extent weight the choice of 
whether to marry, it leaves the ultimate decision to the individual.”156   
¶63 In short, lower courts have consistently sustained workplace policies that raise the 
cost of marrying against claims of “significant interference” with the right to marry. 
¶64 One way to understand the “significant interference” test is that it commits to the 
government’s discretion decisions about how to frame and administer its marriage laws.  
For instance, absent significant interference, no couple, heterosexual or same-sex, may 
demand that lunch hours for clerks be limited to thirty minutes so they can receive their 
marriage license more expeditiously.  No couple could demand that a clerk’s office stay 
open until the late evening to accommodate their schedule—absent significant 
interference.  These are matters for which the state need only a rational basis for deciding 
how best to proceed.157  By the same token, marriage applicants have no Equal Protection 
                                                 
152 Id.  
153 Id. (quoting Schweiker v. Wilson, 450 U.S. 221, 230 (1981)).  The court concluded that Congress has 
“reasonably determined that married couples, as a group, are more likely than any other ‘partners’ in 
farming enterprises to share completely in the products of their efforts—in other words, to be economically 
interdependent.”  Id. at 1007.  See also Martin v. Bergland, 639 F.2d 647, 650 (10th Cir. 1981). 
154 697 F.2d 46, 47–48 (2d Cir. 1982). 
155 Id. at 50. 
156 Id. at 50 (“[T]he objectives sought by the 1969 Act—the maintenance of horizontal equity and 
progressivity, and the reduction of the differential between single and married taxpayers—were clearly 
compelling.”). 
157 One rational basis for a hardship exemption would obviously be to preserve as much religious freedom 
as possible in a liberal society.  See infra Part V (discussing state and Federal Religious Freedom 
Restoration Acts).  Another ground would be to avoid needlessly imposing costs on religious objectors 
when there is no adverse effect on the government’s operation or the public’s interests.  See supra Part 
III.B.  Exemptions also provide “elbow room” for individuals with minority viewpoints in society, allowing 
citizens with widely divergent views to live together in a pluralistic society.  Id.  Exemptions may also 
honor the settled expectations of valued, long-term employees.  See supra Part II.B. 
 Legislatures may also justify exemptions on the prudential ground that they “lower the stakes” in the 
debate about same-sex marriage, about which public opinion continues to be deeply divided.  See, e.g., 
William N. Eskridge, Jr., Andrew Koppelman, & George Dent, Noah’s Curse and Paul’s Admonition: How 
the Civil Rights Revolution Helps Us Understand Recent Clashes Between Religious Liberty and Gay 
Equality, in ANDREW KOPPELMAN, & GEORGE DENT, MUST GAY RIGHTS CONFLICT WITH RELIGIOUS 
IDENTITY? (forthcoming 2010) (“[J]udges are incompetent to resolve these issues where the nation is 
closely but intensely divided but they can and ought to lower the stakes of such primordial politics.  
Lowering the stakes means that judges should not prematurely constitutionalize fundamental issues where 
the nation is not settled; on the other hand, judges can sometimes ameliorate local conflicts that have 
escalated.”); Robin Fretwell Wilson, Same-Sex Marriage Law Lacks Religious Protection, BANGOR DAILY 
NEWS, Oct. 17, 2009,  http://www.bangordailynews.com/detail/125681.html (arguing that religious liberty 
exemptions in same-sex marriage laws “go a long way to turning down the temperature in the heated debate 
over” same-sex marriage). 
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basis158 for demanding that clerks not be permitted to step aside from facilitating 
marriages that for them violate deeply held religious beliefs so long as the applicants are 
admitted to the status of marriage without significant interference. 
¶65 The principle that emerges from this analysis is that allowing some limited 
religious liberty exemptions for government employees, cabined by hardship to same-sex 
couples, would not somehow deprive same-sex couples of the right to marry.  Should a 
clerk object to issuing a marriage license to a same-sex couple for religious reasons, 
another clerk in the same office must do the job.159  Such limited accommodations never 
“place[] a direct legal obstacle” on the path to marriage for same-sex couples. 
V. PUBLIC SERVICE UNTAINTED BY RELIGIOUS CONVICTIONS  
¶66 Some assert that since “state officers have duties of equal respect to all persons 
within the state[, i]t is very difficult to see how one can square such a duty with a right, 
religion-based or otherwise, to refuse to provide public services.”160  The logic of this 
claim seems to be that laws allowing religious exemptions should never be applied to 
permit an employee to decline to serve any member of the public.161  This claim falters 
on three grounds.  First, it under appreciates the impact of an exemption qualified by 
hardship and assumes, incorrectly, that an exemption will affect whether the service is 
received.162  Second, it overlooks specific statutory directions to Federal and state 
governments to not burden religious practices.  These statutes embody the legislative 
judgment “that religious exemptions ought often be granted.”163   
¶67 For example, the Federal Religious Freedom Restoration Act of 1993164 and look-
a-like statutes in nineteen states165 (together, “RFRAs”) “facially require strict scrutiny of 
                                                 
158 Again, this analysis assumes that the statute does not make an impermissible classification.  See supra 
note 114 (discussing other grounds on which an exemption may be challenged). 
159 See infra Appendix B. 
160 Lupu & Tuttle, supra note 2, at 294.  The authors softened their position from their original draft, in 
which they stated, “the public has the right to expect that the religious convictions of public employees, 
uncoerced in their choice of job, will not affect those employees’ duties about whom to serve and protect.” 
 Ira C. Lupu & Robert W. Tuttle, Same-Sex Family Equality and Religious Freedom 51–53 (2009) 
(unpublished manuscript, on file with author).  
161 Put another way, this claim seems to assert that the denial of a service should be categorically 
impermissible even though other accommodations short of denial would not be.  Certainly in the abortion 
context, it is difficult to see how the denial of a service to the public necessarily invalidates an 
accommodation when Congress has extended conscience protections to all physicians, even those in the 
government’s employ.  See Robin Fretwell Wilson, The Limits of Conscience: Moral Clashes over Deeply 
Divisive Healthcare Procedures, 34 AM. J.L. & MED. 41, 54 (2008).  More directly relevant here, the clerk 
cases illustrate that Title VII embraces the accommodation of government employees who ask not to fulfill 
a specific task needed by the public when that task can be provided by another willing employee.  See Part 
V.B.   
162 See supra Part III.A.   
163 Volokh, supra note 108, at 617. 
164 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000bb-4 (1994).  In City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507 (1997), the U.S. Supreme 
Court found that the Federal Religious Freedom Restoration Act was unconstitutional as applied to the 
states.  
165 SIDLEY AUSTIN BROWN & WOOD LLP, RELIGIOUS INST. PRACTICE GROUP, QUESTION AND ANSWERS 
ABOUT STATE RELIGIOUS FREEDOM ACTS (4th ed. 2005), available at 
http://www.sidley.com/publications/Detail.aspx?pub=1978 (listing RFRAs in Alabama, Arizona, 
Connecticut, Florida, Idaho, Illinois, Massachusetts, Michigan, Minnesota, New Mexico, Ohio, Oklahoma, 
Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, South Carolina, Texas, Vermont, Washington, and Wisconsin).  Of these 
states, only Connecticut presently recognizes same-sex marriage and also has a state RFRA.  See CONN. 
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all substantial burdens on religious practices.”166  Importantly, RFRAs on their face 
provide “no exceptions for the government acting in special capacities,”167 for instance, 
as an employer.  These statutes affirm that the government can, and indeed must in 
covered jurisdictions, attempt to respect the religious beliefs of their employees.  Because 
state RFRAs “are not frequently invoked,” however, the outer limits of the state’s duty to 
accommodate religious beliefs are not well-defined.168   
¶68 Of the states that have recognized same-sex marriage, one, Connecticut, had 
already enacted a statewide RFRA.169  Perhaps not surprisingly, Connecticut also enacted 
its same-sex marriage law with meaningful exemptions.   
¶69 Third, the claim that government employees should leave their religious 
convictions at the office door or forego government jobs entirely170 also ignores federal 
law that balances both religious observance and workplace demands.  Specifically, Title 
VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (Title VII)171 requires employers, including the 
government, to provide reasonable accommodations of an employee’s religious practice 
or belief unless the employer will experience an undue hardship.172  While Title VII’s 
                                                                                                                                                 
GEN. STAT. ANN. § 52-571b (2010).  See also Eugene Volokh, RFRA State Map, 
http://www.law.ucla.edu/volokh/relmap.pdf (last visited Sept. 3, 2010) (reporting states with state 
constitutional amendments, statutory RFRAs, and state constitutional free exercise clauses interpreted to 
require strict scrutiny). 
166 Volokh, supra note 108, at 598 (arguing that while “RFRAs have more specific, binding text than does 
the Free Exercise Clause,” they nonetheless leave a number of open questions, “creat[ing] opportunities for 
judicial creativity . . . [and] for error and unequal treatment”). 
167 Id. at 635. 
168 Posting of Marci Hamilton, Cardozo School of Law Professor, to Religious Liberty listserv, 
http://www.mail-archive.com/religionlaw@lists.ucla.edu/msg07597.html (Aug. 13, 2008).  But see 1 KENT 
GREENAWALT, RELIGION AND THE CONSTITUTION: FREE EXERCISE AND FAIRNESS, 211 n.32 (2008) (noting 
that courts have been hesitant to find a substantial burden in many RFRA cases). 
169 See CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 52–571b. 
170 See supra notes § 5, 28, 31, and 39 (discussing resignations and calls that employees resign).  For a 
recent example of this claim in the healthcare context, see Ben Smith, Coakley’s Conscience Clause, 
http://www.politico.com/blogs/bensmith/0110/Coakleys_conscience_clause.html (Jan. 15, 2010, 10:41 
EST) (discussing Massachusetts Senate candidate Martha Coakley’s statement on opponent Scott Brown’s 
support for a religious exemption for emergency room personnel opposed to dispensing emergency 
contraceptives; Coakley observed: “You can have religious freedom but you probably shouldn’t work in 
the emergency room.”).  This statement drew criticism from Nathan Diament of the Orthodox Union 
because “‘Massachusetts state law is a model for balancing the rights of religious employees for religious 
accommodation in the workplace—even a workplace such as an ER, with the need for employers to deliver 
goods and services to consumers,’ he said in an email.  ‘This law is designed to assure that people of any 
faith can pursue any career they choose, and not fear they will be excluded because of their commitments 
of conscience.’”  For a discussion of Federal conscience protections for healthcare workers, see Letter from 
Nathan J. Diament, Reverend Joel Hunter, Douglas Kmiec, Dr. Richard Land, Melissa Rogers, Rabbi 
David Saperstein, Reverend Jim Wallis, and Robin Fretwell Wilson to U.S. Dep’t of Health & Human 
Servs. (Apr. 7, 2009) (on file with author) (regarding Proposed Rescission of Bush “Conscience 
Regulation”). 
171 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1) (2010). 
172 The U.S. Supreme Court has grappled with the permissibility of religious accommodations under Title 
VII on several occasions.  In Thornton v. Caldor, the Court held that a Connecticut statute, which provided 
Sabbath observers with an absolute and unqualified right not to work on their chosen Sabbath, violated the 
Establishment Clause, but suggested that Title VII’s call for more measured accommodations would not.  
472 U.S. 703 (1985).  Thornton, a Presbyterian who observed a Sunday Sabbath, worked for Caldor, Inc. in 
one of its retail stores.  Id. at 705.  After declining to work on Sundays, Thornton invoked the protection of 
a Connecticut statute that provided:  “No person who states that a particular day of the week is observed as 
his Sabbath may be required by his employer to work on such day.  An employee’s refusal to work on his 
Sabbath shall not constitute grounds for his dismissal.”  Id. at 706.  Caldor offered to transfer Thornton, 
who refused and was subsequently demoted.  Id. at 706.  Thornton resigned and filed a grievance with the 
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literal requirements have been thinned out by a later U.S. Supreme Court case,173 this part 
                                                                                                                                                 
State Board of Mediation and Arbitration, where he prevailed.  Id. at 706–07. 
 The Court concluded that the statute violated the Establishment Clause, citing Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 
U.S. 602 (1971).  Id. at 708, 710–11.  Under Lemon, to pass constitutional muster, a statute must not only 
have a secular purpose, it must not foster excessive entanglement of the government with religion, nor can 
it have a primary effect of advancing or inhibiting religion.  Id. at 708.  Because the Connecticut statute 
contained no exception for “special circumstances,” it could impose substantial burdens on employers or 
other employees.  Id. at 709.  This might occur, for example, if a Friday Sabbath observer worked in a job 
with a Monday to Friday schedule, forcing the employer to arrange coverage.  Likewise, an absolute right 
to accommodation could force other employees to work in the Sabbath observer's place.  Id. at 709–710.  
Because the accommodation was unqualified, Connecticut's statute had a primary effect of advancing a 
religious practice.  Id. at 710. 
 Justice O’Connor concurred, focusing primarily on the message conveyed by Connecticut’s unqualified 
accommodation.  She concluded that the statute endorsed “a particular religious belief, to the detriment of 
those who do not share it.”  Id. at 711 (O’Connor, J., concurring).  However, she was careful to distinguish 
Title VII, which in her view “calls for reasonable rather than absolute accommodation.”  Id. at 712.  Title 
VII extends “[protection to] all religious beliefs and practices rather than protecting only the Sabbath 
observance.”  Id.  Unlike the Connecticut statute, Justice O'Connor concluded that an “objective observer 
would perceive [Title VII] as an anti-discrimination law rather than an endorsement of religion or a 
particular religious practice.”  Id. 
 A later, direct challenge to Title VII maintained that its exemption of religious organizations from the 
general proscription on religiously based employment discrimination impermissibly “singles out religious 
entities for a benefit.”  Corp. of the Presiding Bishop v. Amos, 483 U.S. 327, 338 (1987).  In Amos, Arthur 
Frank Mayson worked as a building engineer for a nonprofit gymnasium operated by nonprofit groups 
affiliated with the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day Saints (LDS Church).  Id. at 330.  Mayson failed to 
qualify for a “temple recommend,” which would have certified him as a member of the LDS Church, and 
was subsequently terminated from his position.  Id.  Writing for the majority, Justice White explained that 
when the “government acts with the proper purpose of lifting a regulation that burdens the exercise of 
religion, . . . the exemption [need not] come packaged with benefits to secular entities.”  Id. at 338.  Indeed, 
the Court “has never indicated that statutes that give special consideration to religious groups are per se 
invalid.  That would run contrary to the teaching of our cases that there is ample room for accommodation 
of religion under the Establishment Clause.”  Id.  The Court further held that “laws ‘affording a uniform 
benefit to all religions’” are not “subject to strict scrutiny,” but rather “should be analyzed under Lemon.”  
Id. at 339.  Because Title VII’s exemption for religious organizations was “neutral on its face and 
motivated by a permissible purpose of limiting governmental interference with the exercise of religion,” the 
Court saw “no justification for applying strict scrutiny to a statute that passes the Lemon test.”  Id. 
 Mayson and other petitioners also urged that “an exemption statute will always have the effect of 
advancing religion and hence be invalid under the second (effects) part of the Lemon test.”  Id. at 335.  
Rejecting this argument, the Court noted: 
For a law to have forbidden "effects" under Lemon, it must be fair to say that the government 
itself has advanced religion through its own activities and influence.  As the Court observed in 
Walz, “for the men who wrote the Religion Clauses of the First Amendment the ‘establishment’ 
of a religion connoted sponsorship, financial support, and active involvement of the sovereign in 
religious activity.”  
Id. at 337 (internal citations omitted). 
 Although the lower court feared that the exemption “would permit churches with financial resources 
impermissibly to extend their influence and propagate their faith by entering the commercial, profit-making 
world,” there was no evidence in the record that “the [LDS] Church's ability to propagate its religious 
doctrine through the gymnasium is any greater now than it was prior to the passage of” Title VII.  Id. 
 More recently, the Court reaffirmed the permissibility of accommodations outside Title VII that 
“confer[] no privileged status on any particular religious sect, and single[] out no bona fide faith for 
disadvantageous treatment.”  Cutter v. Wilkinson, 544 U.S. 709, 724 (2005).  Cutter unanimously rejected 
an Establishment Clause challenge to the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act of 2000 
because, among other reasons, it mitigated “exceptional government-created burdens on private religious 
exercise,” and took into account the burdens that accommodations would impose on non-beneficiaries.  Id. 
at 720. 
173 Trans World Airlines v. Hardison, 432 U.S. 63 (1977) (holding that Title VII does not require an 
accommodation that would cause more than a minimal hardship to the employer or other employees.).  In 
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shows that real and concrete accommodations are not only possible but have been offered 
to religious objectors even in the cases giving government employers the greatest 
leeway—those involving public safety.  Just as revealing, a trio of cases brought by 
clerks and administrative agents shows the strength of Title VII claims for 
accommodation by persons in routine, predictable administrative roles.  In synthesizing 
these cases, this part concludes that none of the special constraints tying the 
government’s hands in its role as public protector—such as the need to be ready at all 
times for a breach of peace or other calamity—would necessarily prevent exemptions for 
clerks in state licensure offices.   
A. The Public Protector Cases 
¶70 Critics of public servant exemptions rely on cases testing whether Title VII 
demands particular accommodations for police officers who, for religious reasons, refuse 
to guard businesses offering morally-laden services, like gambling or abortion.174  In 
Rodriguez v. City of Chicago, for example, a Catholic Chicago police officer, Angelo 
Rodriguez, requested a reassignment after being posted at an abortion clinic in his 
district.175  Officer Rodriguez expressed willingness to serve in the event of an 
emergency breach of peace at the clinic but asked not to be assigned active duty at the 
clinic since it would violate “religious beliefs . . . that prohibit [his] participation in 
keeping abortion clinics open.”176  The Rodriguez court noted that “[u]nder Title VII . . . 
an employer must reasonably accommodate an employee's religious observance or 
practice unless it can demonstrate that such accommodation would result in an undue 
hardship to the employer's business.”177  Indeed, the court ultimately ruled that the city’s 
offer to transfer Rodriguez to a district “comparable to [his own] but without abortion 
clinics,” with “no reduction in his level of pay or benefits,”178 was “a paradigm of 
reasonable accommodation.”179  In a special concurrence, Judge Posner argued for a 
broader holding but agreed that the majority’s “narrow” decision that “the city made a 
                                                                                                                                                 
Hardison, the Court noted but did not reach a separate ground for objection to Title VII’s religious 
accommodation provisions, that it violates the Establishment Clause.  Id. at 70.  In this view, requiring an 
employer to give a Christian her Sundays off so that she can honor her religious tenets while denying an 
Atheist the same consideration simply because she would use the time for secular purposes is 
unconstitutional.  See, e.g., HAROLD S. LEWIS, JR. & ELIZABETH J. NORMAN, EMPLOYMENT 
DISCRIMINATION LAW AND PRACTICE § 2.23 (2d. ed. 2004).  Religious accommodations under Title VII 
have survived challenge in the Courts of Appeals, largely because Title VII does not require “absolute 
deference to the religious practices of the employee, allows for consideration of the hardship to other 
employees and to the company, and permits an evaluation of whether the employer has attempted to 
accommodate the employee.”  Protos v. Volkswagen of Am., 797 F.2d 129, 136 (3d Cir. 1986) (listing 
similar cases from the Courts of Appeals in the Sixth, Seventh, and Eighth Circuits).  See also LEWIS & 
NORMAN, supra note 173, at 128. 
174 See Lupu & Tuttle, supra note 2, at 84-6. 
175 Rodriguez v. City of Chicago, 156 F.3d 771 (7th Cir. 1998).  
176 Rodriguez v. City of Chicago, No. 95 C 5371, 1996 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 533, at *3–4 (N.D. Ill. Jan. 11, 
1996), aff’d, 156 F.3d 771 (7th Cir. 1998). 
177 Rodriguez, 156 F.3d at 775 (emphasis added).  
178 Id. at 775–76.  Under the terms of his employment with the city, the officer had a number of avenues 
available to keep his job while avoiding clinic duty, including: (1) transferring with no change in salary or 
benefits to one of six districts that contained no abortion clinic; (2) changing his shift; (3) changing his start 
time; or (4) applying for “special function assignments.”  Id. at 774–75.  
179 Id. at 775 (quoting Wright v. Runyon, 2 F.3d 214, 217 (7th Cir. 1993), cert. denied, 510 U.S. 1121 
(1994) (internal quotations omitted)). 
N O R T H W E S T E R N  J O U R N AL  O F  L A W  A N D  S O C I A L  PO L I C Y  [ 2 0 1 0  
 
350 
reasonable effort to accommodate Officer Rodriguez’s religious beliefs . . . is 
convincing.”180 
¶71 Like Title VII itself, Rodriguez affirms Title VII’s legal duty to accommodate 
religious beliefs while leaving open what constitutes a reasonable accommodation.  
Nonetheless, critics of exemptions for public employees cite Rodriguez because of a 
passage in Chief Judge Posner’s concurrence.  In dicta, Judge Posner went beyond the 
narrow holding to advocate that public safety officers “have no right under Title VII to 
recuse themselves from having to protect persons of whose activities they disapprove for 
religious (or any other) reasons.”181  As Posner explained,  
When the business of the employer is to protect the public safety, the 
maintenance of public confidence in the neutrality of the protectors is 
central to effective performance, and the erosion of that confidence by 
recognition of a right of recusal by public-safety officers would so 
undermine the agency's effective performance as to constitute an undue 
hardship within the meaning of the statute.182   
¶72 Despite Posner’s concerns about the practicality of exemptions, the city appears to 
have staffed around Officer Rodriguez’s refusal without great hardship.  In the ten 
months leading up to the district court hearing, Officer Rodriguez capitalized on other 
assignments available to him to keep his job while avoiding permanent clinic duty183—
suggesting that the city’s standard accommodations did not affect police department 
effectiveness.184  Indeed, as the court recognized, the city posted other officers at the 
clinic on a weekly basis for multiple shifts over a ten-month period despite Officer 
Rodriguez’s technical unavailability.185 
¶73 A later Seventh Circuit case considered a different question, namely whether when 
“no accommodation was attempted . . . [if] the statute requires one.”186  In that case, 
Officer Endres, a Baptist opposed to gambling, was assigned to a casino.  He asked to be 
transferred from the casino facility, which was not possible once “an actual assignment 
[was] made.”187  When Endres refused to report for duty at the casino, he was fired.188  
Endres sued, arguing that he should have been given another assignment outside the Blue 
Chip Casino. 
¶74 Ironically, Endres involved two accommodations: the one Endres was offered and 
the one he was not.  As the lower court decision explained, when Endres  
informed the Superintendent that his religious convictions would conflict 
with his assignment as a gaming agent . . . [t]he Superintendent asked 
Endres whether he could work on the dock or other location nearing the 
                                                 
180 Rodriguez, 156 F.3d at 779. 
181 Id. (Posner, J., concurring).  
182 Id. at 779–80. 
183 Id. at 774–75. 
184 Id. at 779–80.  
185 Id. at 775. 
186 Endes v. Ind. State Police, 349 F.3d 922, 926 (7th Cir. 2003). 
187 Id.  
188 Id. at 924. 
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gaming boat, e.g., hotel lobbies, lounges, or parking lots.  Endres 
responded that he could not become a gaming agent in any form, even a 
modified version.189   
Thus, Endres was offered an exemption to accommodate his religious beliefs, just not one 
that was acceptable to him.190  
¶75 Although Endres’ Superintendent attempted to accommodate Endres, 191 the 
Seventh Circuit treated the case as one in which no accommodation had been attempted.  
Judge Easterbrook’s opinion begins by noting that “Indiana concedes that the State Police 
must not discriminate against any religious faith,” then proceeds to consider whether 
accommodation of Endres’ “desire for different duties” other than at the Blue Chip 
Casino was demanded by Section 701(j) of Title VII.  While the Court noted that the U.S. 
Supreme Court’s decision in Trans World Airlines v. Hardison192 “does not require an 
accommodation that would cause more than a minimal hardship to the employer or other 
                                                 
189 Endres v. Ind. State Police, 794 N.E.2d 1089, 1092 (Ind. Ct. App. 2003), aff’d in part and superseded in 
part, Endres v. Ind. State Police, 809 N.E.2d 320 (Ind. 2004). 
190 A third Seventh Circuit case also considered “[r]eligiously motivated selectivity” in performing the 
requirements of one’s job.  Ryan v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 950 F.2d 458, 461 (7th Cir. 1991).  In that case, 
John C. Ryan, an FBI agent in charge of domestic security and terrorism investigations in Peoria, Illinois, 
informed his superiors that his religious beliefs prevented him from handling certain assignments.  Id.  In 
particular, he was unwilling to participate in cases investigating the “PLOWSHARES” Group for 
vandalism and destruction of government property as nonviolent protests of violence.  Id. at 459.   
 Another agent offered to exchange assignments, something done for Agent Ryan in the past, but he 
declined.  Id.  Instead, Ryan wanted to stay put but “would not promise to carry out similar orders in the 
future and implied that he would refuse to participate in related matters.”  Id. at 461.  After hearings, Ryan 
was terminated.  Id. at 460. 
 On appeal, the Seventh Circuit observed that, under Title VII, “[r]eligiously motivated selectivity in the 
work one is willing to perform is an ‘aspect of religious observance and practice’ that the employer must 
disregard unless it demonstrates that it is ‘unable to reasonably accommodate…without undue hardship.’”  
Id. at 461.  As it did in Endres, the Court acknowledged how difficult it is “for any organization to 
accommodate employees who are choosy about assignments; for a paramilitary organization the tension is 
even greater.  Conscientious objectors in the military seek discharge, which accommodates their beliefs and 
the military’s need for obedience.  Ryan received discharge but does not want it.  He wants to be an agent 
and to choose his assignments too.”  Id. at 462.  On the merits of Ryan’s claim, the court found that 
“[r]eallocation of work between agents is the most obvious accommodation,” and that because Ryan 
refused this offer, the FBI [the court] was not required to consider “undue hardship.”  Id. at 461.  
191 See infra notes 185–188 and accompanying text. 
192 In Trans World Airlines v. Hardison, Hardison, an employee of TWA, “began to study the religion 
known as the Worldwide Church of God.”  432 U.S. 63, 67 (1977).  Hardison informed his superiors that, 
as part of his religion, he could no longer work between sundown on Friday and Saturday.  Id. at 67–68. 
Hardison’s request was initially honored, as his seniority allowed him to be scheduled for shifts without 
Saturdays, in accordance with TWA’s collective bargaining agreement.  Subsequently, Hardison requested 
and was granted a transfer to another building, where he had no seniority.  Id. at 68.  As a result, the only 
shifts available to him included work on Saturdays.  Id.  The airline refused to allow him to work only four 
days a week or to schedule another worker not regularly assigned to work Saturdays to take his place, as 
doing so would require the payment of premium wages.  Id.  The airline also refused to shift other Saturday 
workers or a supervisor to his position, as doing so “would simply have undermanned another operation.”   
Id. at 69.   Hardison refused to show up for work on Saturdays and so, after a hearing, was terminated for 
insubordination.  Id. 
 The Court held that Title VII does not require employers to bear more than a de minimis burden to 
reasonably accommodate religious observers.  Id. at 84.  The duty to accommodate the religious beliefs of 
an employee did not compel the airline to violate the seniority system established under its collective 
bargaining agreement.  Id. at 79.   
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employees,”193 it did not resolve Endres’ request for a transfer under the “undue 
hardship” prong.194  Instead, the Court concluded that “Endres has made a demand that it 
would be unreasonable to require any police or fire department to tolerate.”195   
¶76 In Endres’ case, not enough officers volunteered for casino duty, forcing the State 
Police to draft officers.  In such a system, “[e]xcusing officers from the risk of unpopular 
assignments would create substantial costs for fellow officers who must step in, as well 
as the police force as an entity.”196  Further, “[e]ven if it proves possible to swap 
assignments on one occasion, another may arise when personnel are not available to 
cover for selective objectors.”197  In a heterogeneous force, “juggling assignments to 
make each compatible with the varying religious beliefs of [the officers] would be 
daunting to managers and difficult for other officers who would be called on to fill in for 
the objectors.”198  Even if it could be met “without undue hardship, this demand . . . 
would not be reasonable—and § 701(j) calls only for reasonable accommodations.”199  
The court ultimately concluded that “paramilitary organizations,” like fire departments 
and police departments, that choose not to accommodate an officer have not violated 
Title VII because of the unique constraints departments charged with public protection 
may be under.200 
¶77 Endres unsuccessfully petitioned for rehearing en banc.201  Three judges who 
dissented from the rehearing’s denial faulted the majority decision for “blue pencil[ing] 
the reasonable accommodation requirement from the statute as it applies to police and 
                                                 
193 Trans World Airlines v. Hardison is criticized for scaling back an employer’s duties to provide 
accommodation under Title VII.  See James M. Oleske, Jr., Federalism, Free Exercise, and Title VII: 
Reconsidering Reasonable Accommodation, 6 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 525, 533–34 (2004) (describing the 
“Court’s watered-down interpretation of the ‘undue hardship’ standard”).  Since Trans World Airlines v. 
Hardison, there have been legislative efforts to provide greater religious protection to employees.  See 
Workplace Religious Freedom Act of 2007, H.R. 1431, 110th Cong. (2007), available at 
http://www.govtrack.us/congress/bill.xpd?bill=h110-1431&tab=summary (amending “the Civil Rights Act 
of 1964 to modify the definition of ‘religion’ for purposes of coverage under that Act by requiring 
employers to make an affirmative and bona fide effort to reasonably accommodate the religious practices of 
employees”) (referred to committee without further action); Hearing on H.R. 1431 Before the Subcomm. on 
Health, Employment, Labor, and Pensions of the U.S. House of Rep. Comm. on Education and Labor (Feb. 
12, 2008) (testimony of Helen Norton), available at http://edlabor.house.gov/testimony/2008-02-12-
HelenNorton.pdf) (pointing out that care must be taken to ensure that strengthening religious 
accommodation for workers does not negatively affect “third parties’ civil rights, religious liberties, 
reproductive rights, and other important health care needs”).  
 Notwithstanding Hardison, some commentators urge that “there remains a substantial category of low-
to-no-cost accommodations that employers are often required to provide.”  See Oleske, supra note 193, at 
534 (collecting cases).  See also infra Part V.B (discussing the accommodations of employees in routine, 
predictable, administrative positions).   
194 While “[r]easonableness and the avoidance of undue hardship are distinct, . . . [s]elective objection to 
some of the employer's goals raises problems” on both branches, the Court noted.  Endres v. Ind. State 
Police, 349 F.3d 922, 925 (7th Cir. 2003).  It nonetheless resolved Endres’ case on the reasonableness 
prong.  Id. at 929–30. 
195 Id. at 926–27 (emphasis added). 
196 Id. at 925 (emphasis added). 
197 Id. at 927 (emphasis added). 
198 Id. at 925. 
199 Id.  
200 Id.  
201 See id. at 927–930 (Ripple, J., dissenting from a denial of a petition for rehearing en banc) (questioning 
how the majority opinion can be reconciled with the court’s earlier opinion in Rodriguez).  
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fire personnel”—in direct conflict with decisions of other circuits.202  A number of 
Federal Courts of Appeal have concluded that public employers can accommodate the 
religious beliefs of their employees while carrying out their core mission: providing 
services to all who are entitled to them.203  For example, in Shelton v. University of 
Medicine & Dentistry of New Jersey,204 the United States Court of Appeals for the Third 
Circuit considered a Title VII religious discrimination claim by a staff nurse, Yvonne 
Shelton, who asked not to perform emergency abortions.205  Shelton worked in the Labor 
and Delivery (L&D) section of a state hospital.206  Although the L&D section did not 
provide elective abortions, occasionally emergencies required staff to terminate a 
patient’s pregnancy.207  Shelton, a devout Pentecostal, refused to participate in these 
procedures, in several instances delaying the emergency treatment.208  Due to budget 
cuts, the hospital was unable to staff around Shelton’s refusal by looking to other nurses.  
The hospital informed Shelton that she could no longer work in L&D, but offered to 
transfer her to the Newborn Intensive Care Unit (NICU) or to help her secure an open 
position elsewhere in the hospital system.209  Shelton refused, was fired, and 
subsequently brought suit under Title VII, arguing religious discrimination.210   
¶78 In its opinion, the court first concluded that Shelton had established a prima facie 
case of religious discrimination.  The burden then shifted “to the Hospital to show either 
that it offered Shelton a reasonable accommodation, or that it could not do so because of 
a resulting undue hardship.”211  The court accepted the hospital’s argument that it had 
provided reasonable accommodations for Shelton; there was no evidence that the 
proffered transfer would result in a loss of pay or benefits to Shelton or that she would be 
asked to provide care in the NICU that would be “religiously intolerable.”212  Shelton’s 
steadfast refusal to “cooperate in attempting the find an acceptable religious 
accommodation was unjustified” and “undermined the cooperative approach to religious 
accommodation that Congress intended to foster,” ultimately dooming her claim.213 
¶79 The court then considered whether Title VII “required a presumption of undue 
hardship” when applied to healthcare providers and other public protectors and concluded 
that it did not.214  While the court recognized that public trust and confidence requires 
                                                 
202 See id. at 927 (noting that the majority’s decision “deprives those who serve us in important public 
safety positions from a protection that they enjoy in every other circuit in the United States”). 
203 Id. (collecting those decisions).  These courts have rejected a per se presumption that accommodating a 
public employee would either be unreasonable or an undue hardship on public employers.  See also Part 
V.B. 
204 See Shelton v. Univ. of Med. & Dentistry of N.J., 223 F.3d 220, 228 (3d Cir. 2000) (finding public 
hospital had reasonably accommodated Pentecostal nurse opposed to assisting with emergency abortions by 
offering her a transfer to a different unit). 
205 Id. at 222. 
206 Id.  
207 Id.  
208 Id. at 223. 
209 Id. 
210 Id.  
211 Id. at 225.  
212 Id. at 227.  
213 Id. at 228.  The Court affirmed summary judgment in favor of the hospital.   
214 Id. 
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that healthcare professionals must “provide treatment in time of emergencies,” this did 
not by itself negate the duty to attempt to take the objector out of that role.215 
¶80 As this discussion shows, even in the cases most hostile to the need for 
accommodations, those involving public protectors, public employers can and routinely 
do offer new assignments, transfers, and low-level work-arounds short of a new 
assignment, allowing the religious objector to step aside from services that violate deeply 
held religious beliefs.  As the next subpart illustrates, the case for religious exemptions 
appears to be much more compelling to the courts when the government employee 
occupies an administrative role in which the employee would only infrequently be asked 
to provide the disputed service. 
B. The Clerk Cases 
¶81 In American Postal Worker’s Union v. Postmaster General, two mail clerks whose 
religious beliefs prevented them from processing draft registration forms sued when a 
U.S. Postal Service regulation prohibited them from passing the registrant onto another 
clerk.216  The plaintiffs won in the District Court, which awarded summary judgment to 
the clerks, finding that the Postal Service had violated Title VII.217  The United States 
Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reversed and remanded.218  It found that the 
District Court failed to raise and answer one crucial question under Title VII: whether the 
accommodation offered by the employer “reasonably preserves the affected employee’s 
employment status, i.e., compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of 
employment.”219  The employees sought to stay in their present positions while simply 
making referrals to another clerk.220  The Postal Service instead required them to transfer 
to another position that did not require processing draft registration forms or to take all 
registrants who presented.221  The employees initially refused, arguing that the Postal 
Service’s “fix” forced them into a “less attractive employment status.”222   
¶82 In addressing the sufficiency of the Postal Service’s proposed transfer, the court 
began its analysis by noting that in any Title VII case where an employee seeks an 
accommodation for religious reasons, the initial burden rests on the employee to establish 
a prima facie case of religious discrimination.223  Once the employee carries this burden, 
the employer must prove that “it made good faith efforts to accommodate that 
                                                 
215 Id. 
216 Am. Postal Worker’s Union v. Postmaster Gen., 781 F.2d 772 (9th Cir. 1986). 
217 Am. Postal Worker’s Union v. Postmaster Gen., 1984 WL 48892 (N.D. Cal. 1984).  The District Court 
held that “further accommodation requested by the plaintiffs—allowing [them] to refer draft registrants to 
other available window clerks—cannot fairly be said to cause the Postal Service ‘undue hardship’” and that 
this “failure to implement the reasonable accommodation proposed by the plaintiffs violates the Postal 
Service’s statutory obligation to prevent unnecessary interference with the bona fide religious beliefs of its 
employee [] without undue hardship.”  Id. (emphasis in original). 
218 Am. Postal Worker’s Union, 781 F.2d at 777. 
219 Id. 
220 Id. at 774.  
221 Id. 
222 Id. at 776.  One employee eventually transferred under protest, while the second agreed to process the 
draft registration forms under protest.  Id. at 774.  
223 Id. at 775–76.  
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employee’s religious belief.”224  Any accommodation proposed by the employer must 
eliminate the religious conflict while reasonably preserving the employee’s status.225 
¶83 The Ninth Circuit found that the Postal Service’s proposed transfer would eliminate 
the conflict, but it remanded for a determination of whether a transfer would negatively 
impact the employees’ work status.226  Importantly, while the court recognized that “a 
reasonable accommodation need not be on the employee’s terms only,”227 it ultimately 
concluded that “[w]here the employer’s proposal does not reasonably preserve the 
affected employee’s status . . . the employer has not satisfied its obligation [under Title 
VII].”228  
¶84 Like the clerks in American Postal Worker’s Union, a clerk in McGinnis v. United 
States Postal Service objected to processing draft registration forms.229  In this case, 
however, the Postal Service served McGinnis with a thirty-day notice of dismissal for 
refusing to handle the registration forms.230  McGinnis then sought a preliminary 
injunction to prevent her discharge.231  At trial, the United States District Court for the 
Northern District of California found that in moving to discharge McGinnis, the Postal 
Service likely violated Title VII.  The court undertook fact-specific inquiry into both 
“reasonable accommodation” and “undue hardship.”232   
¶85 Using the burden-shifting framework described above, the court found that the 
Postal Service was “unlikely to meet its burden of showing good faith effort to 
accommodate [McGinnis’] beliefs” because it reflexively informed McGinnis that she 
had no choice but to perform the objectionable service.233  The Postal Service did not 
explore a transfer to other duties nor did it explore how costly another low-level work-
around would be.234 
¶86 The court also found that McGinnis “demonstrated at least a high probability of 
ultimate success on the merits of her Title VII claim,”235 entitling her to the injunction.  
McGinnis would likely succeed on the undue hardship prong, the court noted, because 
“‘undue hardship’ must mean present undue hardship,” not “speculative disruption,” on 
which the Postal Service had relied.236 
¶87 A third case, Haring v. Blumenthal,237 involved a Catholic agent at the Internal 
Revenue Service (IRS) who processed applications for tax exemption.  The IRS did not 
promote the agent “solely” because he “refus[ed] to handle exemptions from persons or 
                                                 
224 Id. at 776.  
225 Id.  
226 Id. at 777. 
227 Id.  Specifically, employers need not accept “any accommodation, short of ‘undue hardship,’ proposed 
by an employee.”  Id. at 776 (emphasis added).   
228 Id.  
229 McGinnis v. U.S. Postal Serv., 512 F. Supp. 517 (N.D. Cal. 1980). 
230 Id. at 519. 
231 Id. 
232 Id. at 523. 
233 Id. 
234 Id. (“First the affidavits from both sides show that the Postal Service made virtually no effort to 
accommodate Petitioner's beliefs.  The government offers little explanation why it did not even try to 
negotiate an arrangement that would, for example, have enabled Petitioner to work at a window not used 
for registration materials.”). 
235 Id. at 524. 
236 Id.  
237 Haring v. Blumenthal, 471 F. Supp. 1172 (D.D.C. 1979). 
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groups which advocate abortions or other practices to which he objects.”238  He sued 
under Title VII, claiming religious discrimination.   
¶88 In rejecting the government’s motion for summary judgment on the Title VII claim, 
the court found that the number of cases that the plaintiff objected to working on a 
miniscule fraction of the overall volume of his work, at most “less than 2% of his total 
workload.”239  With so few objections, another reviewer could process those cases 
without any undue hardship to the IRS.240  This work-around was both feasible and not 
likely to be taxing to the IRS even if willing reviewers were absent or took scheduled 
vacation.241  Nor would there likely be “any significant expense or loss of time, by 
another reviewer.”242  If the agent’s objections to specific work later expanded to 
comprise a significant amount of his total workload, the IRS would then be permitted to 
show undue hardship.243  But until then, the court would be guided by the present 
circumstances, not an unanchored prediction as to what might happen in the future. 
¶89 The Haring court grappled explicitly with what an accommodation might mean for 
“taxpayer confidence in the tax system.”244  Allowing the agent to “disqualify himself 
and request that the matter be reassigned to another reviewer” when “there is a conflict 
between his beliefs and what the law would require him to decide,” would likely not 
“impair taxpayer confidence.”245  The agent did “not assert that he will tailor his 
decisions to his beliefs but merely that, when there is a conflict between his beliefs and 
what the law would require him to decide” would likely not threaten public confidence.  
The court found it: 
difficult to see how [recusal] could impair taxpayer confidence in the tax 
system or the impartiality of the IRS.  On the contrary, decision-makers at 
all levels not infrequently face conflicts of interest financial, family-
                                                 
238 Id. at 1180.  “For the purposes of the [] motion,” the government conceded that the “plaintiff was not 
promoted solely because of his inability or unwillingness to abide by Internal Revenue Service polices on 
abortion.”  Id. at 1175. 
239 Id. at 1180 (“Plaintiff's affidavit which for present purposes must be assumed to be true asserts that in 
his experience the types of cases with which he might have a moral or religious problem constitute only a 
minute percentage of the total volume of applications for exemption processed by a reviewer in the Exempt 
Organizations Division.  He estimates that percentage to constitute ‘a fraction of 1% of the total cases or at 
most less than 2%.’”). 
240 Id. at 1183; id. at 1180 (“Assuming this volume of cases to be accurate, it appears that the Internal 
Revenue Service should have no difficulty, on a purely mechanical level, to accommodate itself to the overt 
manifestations of plaintiff's beliefs.  The applications for exemption which plaintiff refuses to handle could 
clearly be processed without undue hardship or burden to the Service.”).  
241 Id. at 1180 n.23 (“If one of the two reviewers assigned to a particular group of tax law specialists should 
be absent for a few days for one reason or another, and plaintiff, as a reviewer, were to be excused from 
processing objectionable applications, IRS operations would still not be significantly impaired, for even in 
the normal course of events there is a delay of several weeks or months between the submission of 
applications for tax exemption and the IRS decision thereon.”). 
242 Id. at 1183.  
243 Id. at 1182 (“[I]f, contrary to the assumptions made by the Court, it subsequently develops either that 
plaintiff enlarges the zone of his objections to such an extent that it encompasses a significant part of his 
assigned workload, or that other IRS employees follow his example and refuse to handle a significant 
number of applications for tax exemptions on grounds of offensiveness to religious belief, then at some 
point the level of ‘undue hardship’ provided for in the statute will have been reached, and defendant will 
then be free to take all appropriate and necessary action.”). 
244 Id. at 1183. 
245 Id. 
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related, or concerning matters of conscience or fixed opinion.  Officials 
are justly criticized when they make decisions notwithstanding interest or 
bias, particularly when there is no disclosure. 
For the court, disclosure and recusal built public confidence: 
Law and public policy encourage disclosure and disqualification, and 
public confidence in our institutions is strengthened when a decision-
maker disqualifies himself on account of financial interest, inseparable 
bias, or the appearance of partiality.  In a very significant sense . . . public 
policy favors the course of disclosure of bias and disqualification that this 
plaintiff has chosen, and that course may not be regarded as impairing the 
integrity of the IRS decision-making function.246  
In the end, the agent prevailed at a crucial juncture in the litigation, surviving summary 
judgment.247 
¶90 As these cases illustrate, religious accommodations for employees in routine, 
predictable assignments seem to pose far less difficulty than accommodations for public 
protectors for the courts, which are charged with untangling what will and will not be a 
reasonable accommodation short of undue hardship to the employer.  Importantly, all of 
the clerk cases came after and cited the U.S. Supreme Court’s 1975 decision in TWA v. 
Hardison.248 
C.  Lessons for Same-Sex Marriage Exemptions 
¶91 How does Title VII’s duty to accommodate religious objections bear on the 
question of exemptions for government employees?  First, the demands made by Title 
VII on employers means that the question of accommodation is not as easy as saying that 
all clerks must process same-sex marriage applications as a condition of employment or 
face termination.  Title VII sets up the norm that not only should the government 
accommodate the employee if it reasonably can without undue hardship, but that the 
accommodation should reasonably preserve that employee’s employment status.249  Thus, 
it would seem insufficient without more to simply say to religious objectors “put up or 
shut up.”  Second, as McGinnis and Haring illustrate, speculative predictions regarding 
future disruption are not to be considered.  Rather, employers should be guided by the 
facts on the ground.250  
                                                 
246 Id. at 1183. 
247 Id. at 1180. 
248 Compare Trans World Airlines v. Hardison, 432 U.S. 63 (1977), with Am. Postal Worker’s Union v. 
Postmaster Gen., 781 F.2d 772, 775 (9th Cir. 1986); see also McGinnis v. U.S. Postal Serv., 512 F. Supp. 
517, 523 n.7 (N.D. Cal. 1980); Haring, 471 F. Supp. at 1181. 
249 Am. Postal Worker’s Union, 781 F.2d at 776.  The employment status includes compensation, terms, 
conditions, and privileges of employment.  Id.  
250 See, e.g., Haring, 471 F. Supp. at 1182 (“‘[U]ndue hardship’ must mean present undue hardship, as 
distinguished from anticipated or multiplied hardship.  Were the law otherwise, any accommodation, 
however slight, would rise to the level of an undue hardship because, if sufficiently magnified through 
predictions of the future behavior of the employee's co-workers, even the most minute accommodation 
could be calculated to reach that level.”). 
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¶92 Third, while the public protector cases and clerk cases seem to point in very 
different directions, this divergence is more apparent than real.  True, the public protector 
cases afford special scrutiny to accommodations for certain government employees, lest 
public confidence in the government wane.  But at most the public protector cases say 
that government employees in “paramilitary” organizations charged with public 
protection must check their consciences at the door—at least in the states encompassed 
by the Seventh Circuit.251  
¶93 For the Seventh Circuit, an absolute bar on accommodating such officials is 
warranted, both as a matter of principle and as a matter of practicality.  As Judge Posner 
said in his concurrence in Rodriguez, “[w]hen . . . the maintenance of public confidence 
in the neutrality of the protectors is central to effective performance . . . recusal [may 
seriously] undermine the agency’s effective performance” and so become an undue 
hardship to the government.252  After Endres, a fire or police department may steadfastly 
refuse to provide any accommodation253 because of the job’s dictates: a breach of peace 
may occur at any time outside an abortion clinic for which all officers on duty may well 
be needed.  Even without large-scale disturbances, shuffling schedules to ensure 
appropriate coverage by officers while accommodating an objector could significantly tax 
the scheduling capacity of the department, not to mention the superintendent’s patience.   
¶94 But none of these constraints would appear to forgive the duty to make a good faith 
attempt to accommodate the deeply held religious beliefs of clerks who object to 
facilitating same-sex marriage.  Obviously, the local marriage registrar or clerk’s office is 
not a “paramilitary organization.”  The clerk’s office is not charged with public safety, 
and clerks are not responsible for matters of life and death as part of their job.  Moreover, 
clerks process applications that involve no real discretion.  Same-sex couples need these 
services infrequently but predictably.  Putting aside the pent-up demand immediately 
after recognition of same-sex marriage,254 this ministerial function is easily and 
efficiently fulfilled during normal business hours, with no indication that the workload 
will become less predictable overnight.  Like the Title VII claims made in the clerk cases, 
the ability to serve the public is unlikely to be threatened by shuffling what is a rote, 
infrequent, predictable task to co-workers who have no objection.   
¶95 Fourth, and perhaps most salient here, both the public protector and the clerk cases 
affirm the duty to try to accommodate the religious beliefs of employees.  Even in the 
most hostile jurisdiction, the Seventh Circuit, government employers could and did 
choose to accommodate the religious beliefs of their employees, as Rodriguez and Endres 
illustrate.  Both cases involved some attempt by the government agency to offer the 
employee a work-around, albeit rejected by the employee, suggesting that creative 
exemptions can often work without unduly interfering with the public mission.255  
                                                 
251 The Seventh Circuit encompasses Illinois, Indiana, and Wisconsin. 
252 Rodriguez v. City of Chicago, 156 F.3d 771, 779–80 (7th Cir. 1998) (Posner, J., concurring).   
253 The department may refuse to accommodate if no collective bargaining agreement or contract requires 
otherwise, as it did in Rodriguez.  See id. at 773–74. 
254 For instance, in D.C., as Congress’ thirty-day review period of D.C.’s new same-sex marriage law was 
ending, allowing couples to get licenses, many couples sought a license on the first day available.  Long 
lines thus came as no surprise.  See Chuck Colbert, Same-Sex Couples Lining Up for Marriage Licenses in 
D.C., DALLASVOICE.COM, Mar. 4, 2010, http://www.dallasvoice.com/artman/publish/article_12556.php. 
255 See supra Part V.A. 
Vol. 5:2] Robin Fretwell Wilson 
359 
¶96 Fifth, while public confidence in government may well be in need of bolstering 
today,256 open, transparent recusal can assure and foster public trust.  As the Haring court 
explained, “disclosure of bias and disqualification” is favored and “may not be 
regarded as impairing the integrity of the [public agency’s] decision-making function.”257  
¶97 At the end of the day, what matters is whether same-sex couples receive the 
services needed to formalize their relationships as promptly as any other couple.258  If this 
happens, then there is nothing illegitimate about the state allowing religious objectors to 
act in accordance with their faith so long as it does not create an undue hardship for the 
agency employing them, or, as our proposed Marriage Conscience Protection requires, 
for the public itself. 
VI. CONCLUSION 
¶98 Allowing a public employee to act in accordance with her religious convictions by 
not facilitating same-sex marriages causes deep anxiety for many.  Surely, skeptics 
believe, there must be some hidden cost imposed on same-sex couples, if not on the 
government or the objector’s co-workers.  Of particular concern is whether allowing a 
religious objection will somehow erect a barrier to the right to marry because clerks 
occupy an important point on the path to marriage and could theoretically lock same-sex 
couples out of marriage through their refusal.   
¶99 The facts on the ground in Massachusetts—which has the longest running 
experience with same-sex marriage in the United States—give ample assurance that 
same-sex couples will not somehow bear the cost of religious objections qualified by 
hardship, as proposed here.  Same-sex marriage applications comprise a miniscule part of 
the overall workload in the local marriage registrar’s office.  If that office is staffed by 
three clerks, Faith, Hope, and Charity, and only Faith has a religious objection to 
assisting with same-sex marriage applications, allowing Faith to step aside when no 
hardship will result for same-sex couples is costless.  If a same-sex couple, Joe and Eric, 
want a marriage license today, they can be assured that if the doors are open and the 
lights are on, they will receive the needed license.  Hope or Charity can assist the couple, 
and if Hope and Charity are not available, for reasons of sickness or planned vacation or 
                                                 
256 See Pew Poll: 4 Out of 5 Americans Don’t Trust Washington, USA TODAY, Apr. 19, 2010, available at 
http://www.usatoday.com/news/washington/2010-04-19-poll-government-distrust_N.htm.  
257 Haring v. Blumenthal, 471 F. Supp. 1172, 1182 (D.D.C. 1979). 
258 Some may worry that even in the absence of delay, a noticeable shift of a license application from the 
religious objector to a willing co-worker would impose a dignitary harm on the same-sex couple.  See 
Brownstein, supra note 15.  As I have argued elsewhere, accommodations should and can be structured so 
that “no one would ever know that a religious objector stepped aside.”  See Wilson, The Calculus of 
Accommodation, supra note 16, at *17.  In one possible scheme, “same-sex couples are not asked to step 
into another line.  They are not asked to wait longer.  And they don’t even know that they have been 
queued to a non-objecting clerk.”  Id.  Such structures may not always be feasible or convenient for every 
government office, however. 
 A harder question is whether a same-sex couple, who experiences no delay but is in fact aware that a 
shift was made from one clerk to another, will nonetheless suffer a hardship.  I think this is a difficult 
question.  But I do believe that it goes too far to say that a member of the public is harmed simply because 
an exemption is granted to religious objectors if the member of the public has no personal experience of a 
shift being made from one government employee to another.  In such a case, it is the idea of an exemption 
that gives offense, not the experience of it.  If the abstract idea of a legislative exemption for one person 
can by itself invalidate an exemption, there would be no room for exemptions in any context.   
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any other circumstance, Faith will be required to provide the service that Joe and Eric 
need.  
¶100 Now, the state could tell Faith that, despite her religious objections and despite the 
fact that Hope and Charity would willingly serve Joe and Eric, she must serve every 
couple who presents or get out.  But as this Article illustrates, there are no compelling 
reasons for forcing Faith to undergo such a test of conscience. Forcing a public employee 
with a religious objection to facilitate a same-sex marriage would be intolerant in the 
extreme when little is to be gained by such rigid demands.   
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Appendix A 
1. Enacted and Proposed Religious Liberty Exemptions Vermont’s same-sex marriage 
statute contains three religious liberty provisions:259 
VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 18 § 5144(b) (2009): (clergy solemnization): “Persons 
authorized to solemnize marriage (b) This section does not require a 
member of the clergy authorized to solemnize a marriage as set forth in 
subsection (a) of this section, nor societies of Friends or Quakers, the 
Christadelphian Ecclesia, or the Baha'i Faith to solemnize any marriage, 
and any refusal to do so shall not create any civil claim or cause of 
action.” 
VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 9 § 4502(l) (2009): (public accommodations): 
“Notwithstanding any other provision of law, a religious organization, 
association, or society, or any nonprofit institution or organization 
operated, supervised, or controlled by or in conjunction with a religious 
organization, association, or society, shall not be required to provide 
services, accommodations, advantages, facilities, goods, or privileges to 
an individual if the request for such services, accommodations, 
advantages, facilities, goods, or privileges is related to the solemnization 
of a marriage or celebration of a marriage. Any refusal to provide services, 
accommodations, advantages, facilities, goods, or privileges in accordance 
with this subsection shall not create any civil claim or cause of action. 
This subsection shall not be construed to limit a religious organization, 
association, or society, or any nonprofit institution or organization 
operated, supervised, or controlled by or in conjunction with a religious 
organization from selectively providing services, accommodations, 
advantages, facilities, goods, or privileges to some individuals with respect 
to the solemnization or celebration of a marriage but not to others.” 
VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 8 § 4501(b): (fraternal organizations): “The civil 
marriage laws shall not be construed to affect the ability of a society to 
determine the admission of its members as provided in section 4464 of this 
title, or to determine the scope of beneficiaries in accordance with section 
4477 of this title, and shall not require a society that has been established 
and is operating for charitable and educational purposes and which is 
operated, supervised, or controlled by or in connection with a religious 
organization to provide insurance benefits to any person if to do so would 
violate the society's free exercise of religion, as guaranteed by the First 
Amendment to the Constitution of United States or by Chapter I, Article 3 
of the Constitution of the State of Vermont.” 
                                                 
259 An Act Relating to Civil Marriage, S.115, 2009–10 Leg. Sess. (Vt. 2009) (passed into law on April 7, 
2009, over Governor's veto, effective September 1, 2009), available at 
http://www.leg.state.vt.us/docs/2010/bills/Passed/S-115.pdf. 
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2. New Hampshire’s same-sex marriage law contains three religious liberty 
provisions:260 
H.B. 73 § 2: “New Paragraphs; Affirmation of Freedom of Religion in 
Marriage. Amend RSA 457:37 by inserting after paragraph II the 
following new paragraphs: 
Notwithstanding any other provision of law, a religious organization, 
association, or society, or any individual who is managed, directed, or 
supervised by or in conjunction with a religious organization, association, 
or society, or any nonprofit institution or organization operated, 
supervised, or controlled by or in conjunction with a religious 
organization, association, or society, shall not be required to provide 
services, accommodations, advantages, facilities, goods, or privileges to 
an individual if such request for such services, accommodations, 
advantages, facilities, goods, or privileges is related to the solemnization 
of a marriage, the celebration of a marriage, or the promotion of marriage 
through religious counseling, programs, courses, retreats, or housing 
designated for married individuals, and such solemnization, celebration, or 
promotion of marriage is in violation of his or her religious beliefs and 
faith. Any refusal to provide services, accommodations, advantages, 
facilities, goods, or privileges in accordance with this section shall not 
create any civil claim or cause of action or result in any state action to 
penalize or withhold benefits from such religious organization, 
association, or society, or any individual who is managed, directed, or 
supervised by or in conjunction with a religious organization, association, 
or society, or any nonprofit institution or organization operated, 
supervised, or controlled by or in conjunction with a religious 
organization, association, or society. 
The marriage laws of this state shall not be construed to affect the ability 
of a fraternal benefit society to determine the admission of members 
pursuant to RSA 418:5, and shall not require a fraternal benefit society 
that has been established and is operating for charitable or educational 
purposes and which is operated, supervised, or controlled by or in 
connection with a religious organization to provide insurance benefits to 
any person if to do so would violate the fraternal benefit society’s free 
exercise of religion as guaranteed by the First Amendment of the United 
States Constitution and part I, article 5 of the New Hampshire constitution. 
Nothing in this chapter shall be deemed or construed to limit the 
protections and exemptions provided to religious organizations under RSA 
354-A:18.” 
                                                 
260 An Act Affirming Religious Freedom Protections with Regard to Marriage, H.B. 73, 2009 Leg. Sess. 
(N.H. 2009) (signed into law on June 3, 2009, effective January 1, 2010), available at 
http://www.gencourt.state.nh.us/legislation/2009/HB0073.html. 
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3. Connecticut’s same-sex marriage law contains three religious liberty provisions:261 
2009 Conn. Pub. Acts No. 09-13 § 7:  “(a) No member of the clergy 
authorized to join persons in marriage pursuant to section 46b-22 of the 
general statutes shall be required to solemnize any marriage in violation of 
his or her right to the free exercise of religion guaranteed by the first 
amendment to the United States Constitution or section 3 of article first of 
the Constitution of the state. (b) No church or qualified church-controlled 
organization, as defined in 26 USC 3121, shall be required to participate in 
a ceremony solemnizing a marriage in violation of the religious beliefs of 
that church or qualified church-controlled organization.” 
2009 Conn. Pub. Acts No. 09-13 § 17: “Notwithstanding any other 
provision of law, a religious organization, association or society, or any 
nonprofit institution or organization operated, supervised or controlled by 
or in conjunction with a religious organization, association or society, 
shall not be required to provide services, accommodations, advantages, 
facilities, goods or privileges to an individual if the request for such 
services, accommodations, advantages, facilities, goods or privileges is 
related to the solemnization of a marriage or celebration of a marriage and 
such solemnization or celebration is in violation of their religious beliefs 
and faith. Any refusal to provide services, accommodations, advantages, 
facilities, goods or privileges in accordance with this section shall not 
create any civil claim or cause of action, or result in any state action to 
penalize or withhold benefits from such religious organization, association 
or society, or any nonprofit institution or organization operated, 
supervised or controlled by or in conjunction with a religious organization, 
association or society.” 
2009 Conn. Pub. Acts No. 09-13 § 19: “Nothing in this act shall be 
deemed or construed to affect the manner in which a religious 
organization may provide adoption, foster care or social services if such 
religious organization does not receive state or federal funds.” 
4. District of Columbia’s same-sex marriage bill contains three religious liberty 
provisions:262 
D.C. Marriage Bill at § 3:1-3:2:(c) No priest, minister, imam, or rabbi of 
any religious denomination and no official of any nonprofit religious 
organization authorized to solemnize marriages, as defined in this section, 
                                                 
261 An Act Implementing the Guarantee of Equal Protection under the Constitution of the State for Same-
Sex Couples, 2009 Conn. Pub. Acts No. 09-13, § 7(a), available at 
http://www.cga.ct.gov/2009/ACT/PA/2009PA-00013-R00SB-00899-PA.htm (signed into law on Apr. 23, 
2009). 
262 Religious Freedom and Civil Marriage Equality Amendment Act of 2009, D.C. Law No. L18-0110 
(enacted Dec. 18, 2009, effective Mar. 3, 2010), available at 
http://www.dccouncil.washington.dc.us/lims/legislation.aspx?LegNo=B18-0482. 
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shall be required to solemnize any marriage in violation of his or her right 
to the free exercise of religion guaranteed by the First Amendment of the 
United States Constitution. 
(d) Each religious organization, association, or society has exclusive 
control over its own religious doctrine, teachings, and beliefs regarding 
who may marry within that particular religious tradition’s faith, as 
guaranteed by the First Amendment to the United States Constitution.   
(e) Notwithstanding any other provision of law, a religious society, or a 
nonprofit organization which is operated, supervised, or controlled by or 
in conjunction with a religious society, shall not be required to provide 
services, accommodations, facilities, or goods for a purpose related to the 
solemnization or celebration of a same-sex marriage, or the promotion of 
same-sex marriage through religious programs, counseling, courses, or 
retreats, that is in violation of the religious society’s beliefs. A refusal to 
provide services, accommodations, facilities, or goods in accordance with 
this subsection shall not create any civil claim or cause of action, or result 
in a District action to penalize or withhold benefits from the religious 
society or nonprofit organization which is operated, supervised, or 
controlled by or in conjunction with a religious society.263 
Enacted But Repealed Religious Liberty Exemptions 
 
5. Maine’s same-sex marriage law, repealed by 2009 Maine Ballot Question 1,264 
contained a single religious liberty provision:265 
Public Law 2009 Chapter 82 Section 3 provides that: 
3.  Affirmation of religious freedom.   This Part does not authorize any 
court or other state or local governmental body, entity, agency or 
commission to compel, prevent or interfere in any way with any religious 
institution's religious doctrine, policy, teaching or solemnization of 
marriage within that particular religious faith's tradition as guaranteed by 
the Maine Constitution, Article 1, Section 3 or the First Amendment of the 
United States Constitution. A person authorized to join persons in 
                                                 
263 Unlike New Hampshire, Connecticut, and Vermont, D.C.’s law provides no protection for the denial of 
“advantages” and “privileges.”  Nor does it protect the refusal to promote a marriage through “housing 
designated for married individuals,” like married student housing at a religious college.    
264 Maine.gov, November 3, 2009 General Election Tabulations, 
http://www.maine.gov/sos/cec/elec/2009/referendumbycounty.html (last visited Sept. 5, 2010); Abby 
Goodnough, A Setback in Maine for Gay Marriage, but Medical Marijuana Law Expands, N.Y. TIMES, 
Nov. 4, 2009, http://www.nytimes.com/2009/11/05/us/politics/05maine.html?_r=3 (reporting results for 
eighty-seven percent of the precincts). 
265 An Act to End Discrimination in Civil Marriage and Affirm Religious Freedom, ME. REV. STAT. ANN. 
tit. 19-A, § 655, sub-§ 3 (signed into law on May 6, 2009, effective Sept. 12, 2009), available at 
http://mainelegislature.org/legis/bills/bills_124th/chapters/PUBLIC82.asp. 
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marriage and who fails or refuses to join persons in marriage is not subject 
to any fine or other penalty for such failure or refusal. 
Religious Liberty Exemptions in Proposed Same-Sex Marriage Legislation 
New York’s same-sex marriage bill, which was ultimately rejected by the 
New York Senate,266 contained one religious liberty provision:267S 4.  
Subdivision 1 of section 11 of the domestic relations law, as amended by 
chapter 319 of the laws of 1959, is amended to read as follows: 
1.  A clergyman or minister of any religion, or by the senior leader, or any 
of the other leaders, of The Society for Ethical Culture in the city of New 
York, having its principal office in the borough of Manhattan, or by the 
leader of The Brooklyn Society for Ethical Culture, having its principal 
office in the borough of Brooklyn of the city of New York, or of the 
Westchester Ethical Society, having its principal office in Westchester 
county, or of the Ethical Culture Society of Long Island, having its 
principal office in Nassau County, or of the Riverdale-Yonkers Ethical 
Society having its principal office in Bronx County, or by the leader of 
any other Ethical Culture Society affiliated with the American Ethical 
Union; Provided that no Clergyman, Minister Or Society for Ethical  
Culture leader shall be required to solemnize any marriage when acting in 
his or her capacity under this subdivision. 
6. New Jersey’s same-sex marriage bill, 2008 NJ S.B. 1967, entitled "Freedom of 
Religion and Equality in Civil Marriage Act," which was subsequently defeated,268 
contained three exemptions:269 
5. A. No member of the clergy of any religion authorized to solemnize 
marriage and no religious society, institution or organization in this State 
shall be required to solemnize any marriage in violation of the free 
exercise of religion guaranteed by the First Amendment to the United 
States Constitution or by Article I, paragraph 4 of the New Jersey 
Constitution. 
B. No religious society, institution or organization in this state serving a 
particular faith or denomination shall be compelled to provide space, 
                                                 
266 Jeremy W. Peters, New York State Senate Votes Down Gay Marriage Bill, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 2, 2009, at 
A1, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2009/12/03/nyregion/03marriage.html. 
267 An Act to Amend the Domestic Relations Law, in Relation to the Ability to Marry, B. A07732, 2009–
2010 Gen. Assem., Reg. Sess. (N.Y. 2009), available at http://assembly.state.ny.us/leg/?bn=A07732&sh=t 
(died in Senate on Jan. 6, 2010). 
268 The bill was defeated in the New Jersey Senate in a 20-14 vote.  David Kocieniewski, New Jersey 
Senate Defeats Gay Marriage Bill, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 8, 2010, at A18, available at 
http://www.nytimes.com/2010/01/08/nyregion/08trenton.html. 
269 Freedom of Religion and Equality in Civil Marriage Act, S. 1967, 213th Sess. (N.J. 2008), available at 
http://www.njleg.state.nj.us/2008/Bills/S2000/1967_I1.HTM (introduced June 9, 2008, subsequently 
defeated). 
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services, advantages, goods, or privileges related to the solemnization, 
celebration or promotion of marriage if such solemnization, celebration or 
promotion of marriage is in violation of the beliefs of such religious 
society, institution or organization.  
C. No civil claim or cause of action against any religious society, 
institution or organization, or any employee thereof, shall arise out of any 
refusal to provide space, services, advantages, goods, or privileges 
pursuant to this section. No state action to penalize or withhold benefits 
from any such religious society, institution or organization, or any 
employee thereof, shall result from any refusal to provide space, services, 
advantages, goods, or privileges pursuant to this section.  
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Appendix B 
The proposed Marriage Conscience Protection proffered by myself and others 
would provide:270 
 
Section ___  
 
(a) Religious organizations protected.  
 
Notwithstanding any other provision of law, no religious corporation, association, 
educational institution, society, charity, or fraternal organization, and no individual 
employed by any of the foregoing organizations, while acting in the scope of that 
employment, shall be required to  
 
(1) provide services, accommodations, advantages, facilities, goods, or privileges for a 
purpose related to the solemnization or celebration of any marriage; or  
 
(2) solemnize any marriage; or  
 
(3) treat as valid any marriage  
 
if such providing, solemnizing, or treating as valid would cause such organizations or 
individuals to violate their sincerely held religious beliefs.  
 
(b) Individuals and small businesses protected.  
 
(1) Except as provided in paragraph (b)(2), no individual, sole proprietor, or small 
business shall be required  
    (A) to provide goods or services that assist or promote the solemnization or celebration 
of any marriage, or provide counseling or other services that directly facilitate the 
perpetuation of any marriage; or  
    (B) to provide benefits to any spouse of an employee; or  
    (C) to provide housing to any married couple if providing such goods, services, 
benefits, or housing would cause such individuals or sole proprietors, or owners of such 
small businesses, to violate their sincerely held religious beliefs.  
 
(2) Paragraph (b)(1) shall not apply if  
 
     (A) a party to the marriage is unable to obtain any similar good or services, 
employment benefits, or housing elsewhere without substantial hardship; or  
                                                 
270 Letter to Kurt Swaim, Iowa Representative (Feb. 9, 2010) (on file with author) (regarding Proposed 
Iowa Provision for Religious Conscience Protection for Same-Sex Marriage).  This provision refines an 
earlier, less detailed model provision that my co-authors and I first suggested.  See Letter from Thomas C. 
Berg, Robin Fretwell Wilson, Carl H. Esbeck, & Richard W. Garnett, to John Baldacci, Governor, Maine 
(Oct. 1, 2009), available at http://mirrorofjustice.blogs.com/files/wilson-et-al-to-governor-maine-
100509.pdf (regarding Balancing Recognition of Same-Sex Marriage with Religious Liberty). 
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     (B) in the case of an individual who is a government employee or official, if another 
government employee or official is not promptly available and willing to provide the 
requested government service without inconvenience or delay.  
 
(3) A “small business” within the meaning of paragraph (b)(1) is a legal entity other than 
a natural person  
 
     (A) that provides services which are primarily performed by an owner of the business; 
or  
     (B) that has five or fewer employees; or  
     (C) in the case of a legal entity that offers housing for rent, that owns five or fewer 
units of housing.  
 
(c) No civil cause of action or other penalties.  
 
No refusal to provide services, accommodations, advantages, facilities, goods, or 
privileges protected by this section shall  
 
(1) create any civil claim or cause of action; or  
 
(2) result in any action by the State or any of its subdivisions to penalize or withhold 
benefits from any protected entity or individual, under any laws of this State or its 
subdivisions, including but not limited to laws regarding employment discrimination, 
housing, public accommodations, educational institutions, licensing, government 
contracts or grants, or tax-exempt status.  
